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When Agencies Go Nuclear:
A Game Theoretic Approach to the
Biggest Sticks in an Agency's Arsenal
Brigham Daniels*
ABSTRACT
A regulatory agency's arsenal often contains multiple weapons. Occa-
sionally, however, an agency has the power to completely obliterate its regula-
tory targets or to make major waves in society by using a "regulatory nuke."
A regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it packs
power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory targets or signifi-
cantly affect important aspects of society or the economy. Second, from the
perspective of the regulatory agency, it is politically unavailable in all but the
most extreme situations. They are found in many corners of the federal bu-
reaucracy. This Article illustrates that even when individual regulatory nukes
get our attention, we often think about these weapons in unproductive ways.
Typically, regulatory nukes are approached in a bipolar way. On the one
hand, they may be seen as regulatory anomalies with little relevance to most
regulated entities. On the other hand, particularly if an agency has launched
its regulatory nuke, the launch becomes part of agency lore and the story is of
the destruction left in its wake.
Drawing on the Nobel Prize-winning game theory developed by Thomas
Schelling, this Article moves beyond the dud/mushroom cloud dichotomy and
recasts the regulatory nuke as an important factor that influences the calculus
of regulation. This analysis suggests that agencies often get mileage out of
regulatory nukes by pointing their weapons rather than firing them: the power
of the tool is often leverage in regulatory diplomacy-for threats, posturing,
and coercion. Although this Article is based on game theory, it also provides
a wealth of examples that work to illustrate the real-world importance of the
theory to many aspects of the administrative state.
* Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I partic-
ularly appreciate the help of Meg McKean, Jim Salzman, Chris Schroeder, and Erika Weinthal
for providing invaluable comments on several drafts of this Article. For comments early on, I
am grateful to Mark Buntaine, Aaron Bruhl, Scott Daniels, Lincoln Davies, Jim Hawkins, Julie
Hill, Michael Olivas, Buzz Thompson, and Jonathan Wiener. For comments on later drafts, I
thank RonNell Andersen Jones, William Boyd, Mehrsa Baradaran, Ann Carlson, Jason
Czarnezki, Lisa Grow Sun, Blake Hudson, Dan Kahan, Sarah Krakoff, Robin Kundis Craig,
Doug Kysar, David Moore, Lars Noah, Catherine O'Neill, Jed Purdy, Carol Rose, and J.B. Ruhl.
I am also indebted to my research assistants, particularly Jeff Miles and Dustin Glazier at J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, and Michael Lipkin and Cynthia Mabry
at the University of Houston Law Center. I am also very grateful for the tremendous and highly
professional work of The George Washington Law Review. I gratefully acknowledge the Na-
tional Science Foundation for providing me with a graduate research fellowship that enabled me
to perform a portion of the work underlying this Article. All errors in the Article are, of course,
my own.
February 2012 Vol. 80 No. 2
WHEN AGENCIES GO NUCLEAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 444
I. "REGULATORY NUKE" DEFINED ........................ 450
A . D estructiveness ...................................... 450
B. Political Taboo ..................................... 452
C. Sum m ary ........................................... 454
II. EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY NUKES .................... 455
A. Discrimination Law and Federal Funding ........... 455
B. IRS Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status .............. 456
C. Revocation of Broadcast Licenses ................... 458
D. Federal Regulation of State Driver's Licenses ....... 460
E. Laws Linked to Federal Highway Funds ............ 461
F. Institutional Backstops .............................. 462
G. School Closures and the No Child Left
B ehind A ct .......................................... 464
H. Criminal Prosecutions ............................... 465
. Presidential Regulatory Nukes and Desegregation ... 466
J. The NCAA "Death Penalty" Sanction .............. 468
III. A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO
REGULATORY NUKES .................................... 470
IV. THREATS ................................................... 473
A. Surrendering Control ................................ 476
1. Surrendering Control by Deterrent Threats ..... 477
2. Surrendering Control by
"Compellent" Threats .......................... 479
B. Leveraging Uncertainty and the Role
of Brinkmanship .................................... 480
C. Giving Control to a Committed Third Party ........ 482
D. Staking Honor and Reputation ...................... 483
E. Interdependence ..................................... 484
F. Willingness to Take Intermediate Steps .............. 485
V. COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE ........................... 486
A. Factors that Targets Consider ....................... 487
1. Compliance Costs ............................... 487
2. Risk of an Agency Launching a
Regulatory Nuke ............................... 490
3. Harm Associated with a Regulatory Nuke ...... 491
B. Untold Story of Compliance ........................ 492
VI. DETONATION AND HUMILIATION ........................ 493
A. Going N uclear ...................................... 495
B. Keeping Quiet and Backing Down .................. 497
2012]
444 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
V II. RETALIATION ........................................... 499
A. Targets with Their Own Weapons ................... 500
B. Third-Party Retaliation .............................. 501
C. Political Fallout ..................................... 503
C ONCLUSION ................................................... 504
"Speak softly and carry a big stick[ ] .... "
- Theodore Roosevelt1
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
- Mao Tse-Tung2
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1970s, Yale Law School began requiring employ-
ers participating in the law school's on-campus recruiting program to
sign a pledge not to discriminate against students based on a number
of factors, including a student's sexual orientation.3 Most employers
had no problem signing the nondiscrimination pledge, but military
recruiters refused to sign given the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy, 4 which excluded openly gay service members.5 Because of this,
Yale Law School barred military recruiters from its on-campus
recruiting process.6 In the years that followed, Yale Law School con-
tinued to require employers to sign its pledge and military recruiters
continued to refuse to sign, thereby dragging out the stalemate.7
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress gave
the Department of Defense the power to cut off an entire university's
federal funding if any part of that university barred military
recruiters.8 In other words, if Yale Law School did not change its ways
1 RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 123 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Conn. 2005), rev'd sub noma. Burt v.
Gates, 502 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007).
4 This was the official military policy from December 1993 to September 2011. See Phil
Willon, What's Next for Military's Gays, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, at AA1.
5 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
6 Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d at 185.
7 See id.
8 More specifically, Congress enacted a law that prohibits the provision of federal funds
to an
institution of higher education (including any subelement of such institution) if the
Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of that
institution) has a policy or practice ... that either prohibits, or in effect prevents...
a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to
campuses, or access to students... on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting
[Vol. 80:442
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and if the Department of Defense exercised its newfound regulatory
power, all of Yale University (not just the law school) would be at risk
of losing its federal funding. At the time, estimates of Yale's federal
funding amounted to about $300 million annually. 9 The law school
did not receive much of this money, but losing such funding would
have presumably eviscerated Yale's science, engineering, and medical
programs. Despite this risk, Yale Law School continued to adhere to
its policy of barring military recruiters. 10
After it became clear that Yale Law School was not willing to
back down, the Department of Defense gave the law school an ultima-
tum: give the military the same recruiting opportunities the law school
provided to other employers, or lose all federal funding.11 The law
school tried to postpone the day of reckoning and attempted to liti-
gate its way out of the Department of Defense's threat, but was unsuc-
cessful. 12 In 2007, unable to wiggle out of the agency's regulatory
crosshairs, Yale Law School surrendered and opened its doors to mili-
tary recruiters.13
This story of the Department of Defense resorting to a particu-
larly strong regulatory tool provides an excellent example of a govern-
ment agency deploying what I refer to as a "regulatory nuke." A
regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it
packs power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory
targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the econ-
omy. Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is po-
litically unavailable in all but the most extreme situations. They are
not limited to the situation described above, nor does the military
have a monopoly on regulatory nukes within the federal bureaucracy.
In fact, many agencies have regulatory nukes, most of which often go
unnoticed because they are rarely (and sometimes never) launched.
Consider a few examples of some powerful but rarely launched
regulatory nukes. One might be surprised to learn that the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has the power to pull the plug
on major media outlets, such as the National Broadcasting Company,
in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and
to students that is provided to any other employer[.]
10 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1) (2006).
9 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d at 192.
13 Thomas Kaplan, Yale Law, Newly Defeated, Allows Military Recruiters, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2007, at B4.
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by revoking their licenses to broadcast on the public airwaves;14 that
the No Child Left Behind Act gives administrators the power to shut
down public schools all over the country;15 and that the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") has the power to revoke the tax-exempt status
(often an essential component of fundraising) of some of the Nation's
most revered institutions, such as universities, museums, hospitals,
and places of worship.1 6
Sometimes an agency actually launches a regulatory nuke. With
regulatory mushroom clouds on the horizon, these situations quickly
generate news stories, lawsuits, congressional hearings, and scholarly
work. In the recent past, we certainly noticed when the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency swooped in to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac,'17 when the Justice Department put an end to Arthur Andersen
by prosecuting it criminally, 8 and when the IRS revoked Bob Jones
University's tax-exempt status.19
Because regulatory nukes in an agency's arsenal often remain un-
launched, however, it is easy to brush them aside or to pretend that,
for all practical purposes, regulatory nukes do not exist. It is impor-
tant to recognize, though, that even if a regulatory nuke is rarely or
never launched, this does not mean that a regulatory nuke is rarely or
never used. Regulatory nukes often have other uses. Similar to the
ways in which countries rely on nuclear weapons to influence diplo-
macy, agencies often use the threat of regulatory nukes to influence
regulated entities. 20 Just as the military forced Yale Law School's
hand by issuing an ultimatum, leveraging a potential target's fear of a
regulatory nuke's launch can be enough for an agency to secure regu-
latory compliance. Even if an agency does not launch its regulatory
nuke, an agency's threat of the nuke's use may cause some to awe that
the agency pulled out the big guns.
"The big guns." It is striking how much of the vernacular sur-
rounding regulation alludes to warfare. In addition to big guns,2' com-
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 See infra Part II.G.
16 See infra Part II.B.
17 See Julie Anderson Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm
Credit System, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 1, 56.
18 See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Dele-
gations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873, 874 (discussing "a threat by an agency to impose a
sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging 'voluntary' compliance with a request,"
and calling such actions "administrative arm-twisting").
21 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
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mentators, scholars, and decisionmakers talk about an agency's
arsenal,22 war chest,23 and weapons. 24 Further, at times, we label the
conditions sufficient to activate regulatory enforcement as triggers, 25
and call clearly permissible behaviors of regulated entities safe
havens.26 When an agency resorts to extraordinary means in pursuit
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 40 (1992) (discussing "benign big gun" agencies that
"sp[eak] softly while carrying very big sticks"); John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is
Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1729 (1999) (detailing a study of
Australian business regulatory agencies finding "that while the Benign Big Guns rarely or never
used punishment, agencies with weaker powers used prosecution much more often"); Cynthia
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLuM. L. REV.
319, 375 (2005) ("Congress backed up these measures with beefed-up criminal and civil penal-
ties-big guns, indeed-administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).");
Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 397-98 (2007) ("[A]n
administrative agency can rely on self-regulation.., only when the government agency possesses
a 'big gun' of enforcement power-that is, when the agency has access to extremely powerful
sanctions.").
22 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 87 (1998) ("The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative penalties."); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)
("[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject
himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation."); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 108
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (Robinson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Clayton Act ... increases the Commission's
regulatory range as well as its arsenal of regulatory weapons.").
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Mount, 726 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the
"seizing agency could use the forfeiture procedure as a device to contribute to its drug enforce-
ment war chest"); Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be
Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 550
(2001) (stating that "the government increased its war chest to help catch Internet crimes di-
rected against children").
24 See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1990) ("An agency charged
with protecting employees from hazardous chemicals has a variety of regulatory weapons from
which to choose."); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 625 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the All Writs Act "is not a charter to be used at the behest of an administrative
agency in order to supply it with a weapon which Congress has withheld"); Peter H. Schuck,
Some Reflections on the Future of Mass Torts, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 511 (2006) ("[R]egulatory
agencies can wield a formidable armamentarium of weapons.").
25 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 410 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) ("The charge is presented to the agency with jurisdiction over such matters-the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission]-to trigger enforcement proceedings that are intended
to eliminate violations of the [Age in Discrimination Employment Act]."); Sierra Club v. EPA,
557 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The more that is required of the [Environmental Protection
Agency] before it can make such a 'finding,' the less often the agency will be able to pull the
initial enforcement trigger."); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy,
305 F.3d 943, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The point is to trigger agency enforcement and avoid a
lawsuit.").
26 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321,
1330 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Such an exacting standard would ... [allow] clearly misleading state-
ments to escape [U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission] enforcement ... [and afford
brokers a] safe haven so long as no actual 'guarantee' is made."); Hosp. Res. Pers., Inc. v. United
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of regulatory compliance, we might say that the agency dropped the
bomb27 or that it went nuclear.28 At least on an intuitive level, regula-
tion reminds us of warfare, but is there more to the analogy?
For decades, we have described regulation in terms of warfare.
This Article takes a more critical look at the analogy and finds that it
not only provides an apt comparison, but also provides a useful lens
through which to view the calculus of regulation. Specifically, the Ar-
ticle draws on game theory, particularly Thomas Schelling's Nobel
Prize-winning scholarship on countries' uses of nuclear weapons,29 to
explain how agencies use regulatory nukes. It turns out that regula-
tory nukes and actual nukes are used in a similar manner such that the
analogy provides fertile ground to help us understand the largest and
often most misunderstood weapons in an agency's arsenal. Game the-
ory helps us see the fallacy of assuming that because agencies rarely
launch these weapons, they rarely use them. Use of regulatory nukes
more often takes the form of a protracted standoff than a mushroom
cloud. Game theory also provides a lens through which to best view
the threats, posturing, and coercion that occur during the back-and-
forth that is a prelude to a possible launch. Our tendency to focus on
explosions (or the lack of them), while ignoring regulatory diplomacy,
means that we risk missing the bigger picture-just as we would in the
context of actual nuclear bombs if we focused only on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, while ignoring the Cold War. We should not be so blinded
by the explosion of an agency going nuclear that we overlook the
more important story that is hidden in the shadows.
Bringing that important story out of the shadows is a significant
aim of this Article. And telling this story through the lens of game
States, 860 F. Supp. 1557, 1562 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affirmed in part, vacated in part, 68 F.3d 421
(11th Cir. 1995) ("Plaintiff had a reasonable basis for treating its workers as independent con-
tractors under the general safe haven provision of [the Revenue Act of 1978].").
27 E.g., Terry Carter, The Pre-Emption Prescription, 94 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (2008) ("The FDA
dropped another bomb in January with a new rule...."); Ed Anderson, Mayor: B.R. is Doormat
for Feds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 22, 2006, at Al (quoting Baton Rouge mayor as
saying that the Federal Emergency Management Agency "has dropped the bomb on us" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Barbara Behrendt, A New Twist for Manatee Center, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES (Fla.), June 13, 1990, (Citrus Cnty. ed.) at 1 ("[T]he agency came to Crystal River
and dropped its bomb .... ).
28 Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 174 (2009) ("When Milberg
Weiss refused to acquiesce to prosecutors' demands, the Justice Department 'went nuclear,' fil-
ing seven felony counts against the entity in May, 2006."); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both
Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of
Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 329, 342 (2003) ("[A] downgrade by a
rating agency is like a corporate nuclear bomb.").
29 See infra Part III.
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theory not only allows us to see how the game is played, but also how
regulators, potential targets, and lawyers involved could play the game
better. Given that regulatory nukes are found in many regulatory are-
nas, the Article touches significant aspects of many substantive areas
of law, including administrative, environmental, tax, labor, and bank-
ing law, to name a few.
To this end, Part I defines "regulatory nuke." Part II provides ten
examples of regulatory nukes that involve a wide range of agencies
and policy areas. Parts III through VII expand on game theory devel-
oped to explain nuclear deterrence and Schelling's insights to help ex-
plain the strategies employed by agencies to leverage regulatory nukes
and influence their targets. More specifically, Part III provides an
overview of the regulatory nuke game, and the remainder of the Arti-
cle focuses on individual decision nodes introduced in the regulatory
nuke game.
Part IV takes up the topic of agencies threatening to use regula-
tory nukes. This discussion highlights the complexity of the calculus
behind an agency's decision to threaten to launch a regulatory nuke
and also provides agencies with some practical advice about how to
navigate this decision. This Part shows that agencies often use regula-
tory nukes by aiming the nuke instead of launching it, and that this
use makes regulatory nukes much more powerful than their launch
rate would suggest.
Part V examines how targets might react when an agency threat-
ens or fails to threaten the launch of a regulatory nuke. It also high-
lights that whether a regulatory agency is ultimately pushed to the
brink often hinges on the mindset, incentives, and characteristics of
the agency's target.
Part VI delves into the agency's decision of whether to launch the
regulatory nuke. In cases where an- agency has made a threat, this
decision is often triggered by a target refusing to bend to the threat.
Particularly because regulatory agencies often have strong incentives
to back down from having to launch a regulatory nuke, this Part also
illustrates how in some instances giving an agency a regulatory nuke
might actually weaken rather than strengthen a regulatory agency's
authority.
Part VII explains how the concept of retaliation can play out in
the realm of regulatory nukes. In many instances, agencies that
launch regulatory nukes (or even threaten to launch them) often have
them stripped away or downsized by Congress or the courts.
20121
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I. "REGULATORY NUKE" DEFINED
As the term "regulatory nuke" is rooted in a comparison to nu-
clear weapons, it makes sense to step back and ask, "What makes nu-
clear bombs nuclear?" Although there are myriad possible ways to
answer this question accurately, I will focus on two of them. The first
relates to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the second
draws upon the political taboo associated with launching the weapon.
A regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it
packs power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory
targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the econ-
omy. Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is po-
litically unavailable in all but the most extreme situations.
A. Destructiveness
The iconic mushroom cloud images of nuclear weapons make
clear that these weapons can obliterate their targets. Given their
enormous force, it is not surprising that much of the most memorable
commentary about nuclear weapons focuses on their destructive
power. For example, when Albert Einstein said, "I do not know how
the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will
use in the Fourth-rocks!" 30 he captured the fear that nuclear weap-
ons have enough destructive power to obliterate modern society. Sim-
ilarly, John F. Kennedy compared the anxiety created by nuclear
weapons with "liv[ing] under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging
by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by
accident or miscalculation or by madness. '31 He added to that grim
comparison an even more ominous prognosis: "The weapons of war
must be abolished before they abolish us."'32
Historical events are also instructive. Compare, for example,
Germany's air raids of England during World War II with that of the
United States dropping nuclear bombs dropped on Japan. Germany
dropped tons of the conventional explosive, TNT, on England for
fifty-seven nights,33 killing approximately 43,000 people. 34 By con-
30 ALICE CALAPRICE & TREVOR LIPSCOMBE, ALBERT EINSTEIN: A BIOGRAPHY 124
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 John F. Kennedy, Address in New York City Before the General Assembly of the
United Nations (Sept. 25, 1961), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
JOHN F. KENNEDY: 1961, at 618, 620 (1962).
32 Id.
33 ALAN AXELROD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR II 189 (Jack A. Kingston ed., 2007).
34 Id.
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trast, single nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed
about 118,00031 and 73,00036 people, respectively.
Beyond these telling statistics, consider a few descriptions of Hi-
roshima. Begin with the perspective of the Captain of the Enola Gay:
"As the bomb fell over Hiroshima and exploded, we saw an entire city
disappear. '37  From the ground, one eyewitness said Hiroshima
"look[ed] as if a monster steamroller had passed over it and squashed
it out of existence. '' 38 Another reported that Hiroshima was "[n]o
longer a city, but a burnt-over prairie. ' '39 The closer one got to the
point of impact, the more the destructive power of the bomb became
clear: "Of thousands of others, nearer the centre of the explosion,
there was no trace. They vanished. ' 40 Stunningly, when the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty II was signed in the 1990s, at stake were
"[flifteen thousand weapons with an average yield of 20 Hiroshima
bombs. "41
Now, drawing on metaphor, consider the destructive nature of
regulatory nukes. As illustrated, nuclear bombs are destructive to
their targets in two ways.42 First, nuclear weapons can obliterate their
targets.43 To assess the destructiveness of a regulatory tool, we look to
see the extent to which it can obliterate its regulatory targets. In this
analysis, it is the extent of harm rather than the size of the target that
counts. For example, if we were to consider a tool used to regulate
banks, it would not matter if the target were the entire American
banking system, Bank of America, or a local bank serving the town of
American Fork, Utah.44 All the destructiveness test evaluates is the
35 Id. at 425.
36 Id. at 585.
37 Morton S. Perlmutter & Dick Ringler, Nuclear Anxiety: Social Symptomatology and
Educational Therapy, in FAMILIES AND THE PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR ATrACKHOLOCAUST 59,60
(Teresa D. Marciano & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1986).
38 Wilfred Burchett, The Atomic Plague, in REBEL JOURNALISM: THE WRITINGS OF WIL-
FRED BURCHE-r 2, 2 (George Burchett & Nick Shimmin eds., 2007).
39 MICHIHIKO HACHIYA, HIROSHIMA DIARY: THE JOURNAL OF A JAPANESE PHYSICIAN
AUGUST 6-SEPTEMBER 30, 1945, at 8 (Warner Wells ed. & trans., 1955).
40 See Burchett, supra note 38, at 4.
41 Professor Joseph Rotblat, Founder & President, Pugwash Council, Speech Before the
Nobel Committee: Remember Your Humanity (Dec. 10, 1995), available at http://
www.pugwash.org/award/Rotblatnobel.htm.
42 See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
44 It is interesting that this test that focuses on the devastation experienced by targets
maps fairly well to the way that Schelling conceived the strategic interaction at play within nu-
clear strategy. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 15 (2d ed. 2008). He said, for
example, that there is such thing as massive retaliation "on a diminutive scale, with local effects
2012]
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extent to which the regulatory tool destroys the target's ability to
function.
Second, a nuclear weapon's impact is large in scope-it can im-
pact entire cities and beyond.45 Translating destructive scope to the
regulatory world, we look to see how far the harm of the regulatory
tool is felt across society. Drawing on the same banking example, the
destructive scope of harm is much greater if we are talking about the
national banking-system than a national bank, and the destructive im-
pact of both are much greater than the impact felt by a local bank that
only serves a small town.
Whereas nuclear bombs are destructive both in their power to
destroy discrete targets and to inflict harm over large areas, regulatory
nukes only need to be destructive in either their impact or their scope.
Of course, if a regulatory tool is destructive in its impact on targets
and in its scope, it is all the more worthy of being classified as a regu-
latory nuke.
B. Political Taboo
A second trait of a regulatory nuke relates to whether the regula-
tory tool is perceived to be a political regulatory taboo. At the most
basic level, a taboo is something that is culturally forbidden, banned,
or otherwise prohibited.46 Although the concept of taboo is often tied
to religious beliefs and fear of the supernatural, taboo can also grow
out of social custom and risk. 47 Within the context of regulatory
nukes, the taboo makes a regulatory tool politically unavailable to an
agency in all but the most extreme circumstances.
Just as with destructiveness, the inclusion of taboo as a trait of
regulatory nukes grows out of the analogy to nuclear weapons. Four
decades ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson observed that "[t]here is
no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon. '48 Culturally speak-
ing, nuclear weapons were then, and still are, far from conventional:
not unlike those of Hiroshima." Id. (describing the U.S. Army's retaliatory attacks in the 1860s
on American Indian civilians in their winter camps).
45 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
46 Consider, for example, the following definitions for "taboo" found in Merriam-Web-
ster's: "forbidden to profane use or contact because of what are held to be dangerous supernatu-
ral powers"; "banned on grounds of morality or taste"; "banned as constituting a risk"; "a
prohibition against touching, saying, or doing something for fear of immediate harm from a
supernatural force"; "a prohibition imposed by social custom or as a protective measure." MER-
RIAM-WEBsTER'S COLLEGIATE DicriONARY 1271 (11th ed. 2007).
47 Id.
48 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at vii.
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they are weapons regarded as only fit for use under the most dire
circumstances. This perception is perhaps best encapsulated by a eu-
phemism for launching a nuclear weapon-"the unthinkable. ' 49 Al-
though nuclear bombs have existed for more than sixty years,
headlines across the world still demonstrate profound alarm concern-
ing these weapons that grips us when a country even test fires a rocket
designed to deliver a nuclear weapon.50 This stands in contrast to the
TNT-based explosions that occur frequently in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which are portrayed, for the most part, in the international press,
"[n]ot with a bang but a whimper." 51
What explains this difference in cultural perception between nu-
clear bombs and TNT-based bombs? In Schelling's view, the move
from TNT warfare to nuclear warfare crosses a line-something that
he called "the nuclear taboo.152 It is not surprising that nuclear
bombs have become taboo. One reason for the taboo is the destruc-
tive power of nuclear weapons discussed above. Additionally, the
dread and horror of the terrible diseases and deformities inflicted on
bomb survivors, and in many cases their offspring, may be part of the
reason that society views the weapons in such a negative light. Others
may reject use of the nuclear weapon due to the absolute environmen-
tal damage created in every bombed area or the fallout that ensues
after a nuclear explosion.
Schelling noted that we find symbolic thresholds, stopping points,
and taboos in many areas of life where we find conflict and competi-
tion, such as business competition, racial negotiations, gang warfare,
child discipline, and all kinds of negotiated competition.5 3 In fact, ac-
cording to Schelling, these can be found where there is "distinctive
restraint that can be recognized by both sides, conspicuous stopping
places, conventions and precedents to indicate what is within bounds
and what is out of bounds, [and] ways of distinguishing new initiatives
from just more of the same activity. ' '54
49 See, e.g., HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE 19 (1962).
50 See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill & Ian Black, US Condemns Iran's 'Provocative Actions' as
Regime Test-Fires Missile that Could Hit Europe, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 17, 2009, at 19;
North Korea Test-Fires Missiles, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 14, 2009, at A17; N. Korea Test-Fires Mis-
sile, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Mar. 11, 2003, at 1; Michael Slackman, Iran Test-Fires Upgraded
Version of Its Most Advanced Missile, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A22.
51 T. S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in POEMS 1909-1925, at 123, 128 (n.d.).
52 Thomas C. Schelling, Op-Ed., The Nuclear Taboo, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2005, at A14.
53 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 135.
54 Id,
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In addition to the categories Schelling noted, we can add regula-
tion to the aspects of society where we see these symbolic thresholds.
What are the sorts of factors that separate a regulatory taboo from the
world of ordinary regulation and make regulatory nukes perceived as
politically unavailable in all but the most extreme circumstances? The
perception may be credited to a number of factors, including per-
ceived disproportionality between the harm inflicted by the regulated
entity and its punishment, collateral damage associated with a regula-
tory tool imposed on those other than the regulated entity, a history of
not launching the regulatory tool, the political dynamic or social or-
dering of the regulator and its potential targets, and political pressure
and fallout.
Taboo is a function of perception, cultural norms, and expecta-
tions.55 Because of this, any regulatory tool can become more or less
politically taboo as time passes or circumstances change. As a regula-
tory tool becomes more taboo, it makes an agency's threat to use it all
the more incredible-even unthinkable.
C. Summary
To summarize, regulatory nukes have two traits. First, regulatory
nukes have great destructive power. The more power a regulatory
tool has to annihilate potential targets (i.e., destructive impact) and
the broader its impact is on society (i.e., destructive scope), the more
accurate the term "regulatory nuke" becomes. Second, regulatory
nukes have political taboos associated with them. Different regula-
tory nukes might be considered taboo for different reasons, but for
whatever the reason, taboo makes the tool politically unavailable.
As illustrated in Figure 1, identifying regulatory nukes is more art
than science, particularly when the tool is not extremely destructive or
politically taboo. A regulatory tool need not meet the extreme of ei-
ther pole of these two spectrums, but it must contain sufficient
amounts of each. Unfortunately, what is meant by "sufficient
amounts" is more of a judgment call than a bright line. To provide
additional context, I give ten examples of regulatory nukes below.
55 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1. Identifying Regulatory Nukes
More Politically Taboo
Nuclear
Less Destructive More Destructive
Less Politically Taboo
II. EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY NUKES
This Part provides ten examples of regulatory nukes from a wide
variety of policy areas and administrative agencies. The diversity of
examples highlights the importance of regulatory nukes in many areas
of regulation.
A. Discrimination Law and Federal Funding
As a condition for receiving almost any federal grant, the recipi-
ent must agree to comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 56
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national
origin.57 Title IX provides similar protections for sex-based discrimi-
nation within the educational context.58 In passing this civil rights leg-
islation, Congress not only created an obligation for federal grantees
to comply with each act, but it also provided agencies that disseminate
federal funds the ability to revoke those funds in the event that dis-
crimination prohibited by each statute occurs. 59 Based on this regula-
tory power, a number of agencies have promulgated rules describing
how federal funds may be revoked.60
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
57 Id.
58 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
59 See id. § 1682; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
60 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 619 n.7 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (listing examples of such regulations); see also, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-12 (2011) (U.S.
Department of Agriculture); 15 C.F.R. §§ 8.1-15 (2010) (Department of Commerce); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 43h2.101-.112 (2010) (Department of Justice); 32 C.F.R. §§ 195.1-.14 (2010) (Department of
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From the regulatory target's perspective, revocation of federal
funding can prove extremely destructive. Take, for example, the im-
portance of federal funding for colleges and universities. The federal
government funds about sixty percent of the costs of research pro-
grams within higher education. 61 Cuts at that level may threaten the
viability of such programs.
Revocation of federal funding is also a political taboo. For exam-
ple, in the nearly forty years since the enactment of Title IX, revoca-
tion has been an extremely rare event 62 even though sex-based
discrimination has been prevalent during that time. 63 Why has revoca-
tion become a political taboo? It not only punishes the offenders of
the law, but also harms many people who did nothing wrong: a single
discriminator within an institution can cut off a vital pipeline of finan-
cial support for the institution as a whole. Moreover, discrimination is
unfortunately so commonplace that revocation seems like a dispro-
portionate remedy. Particularly for large institutions, revocation
works like a sledgehammer when a scalpel would suffice.
B. IRS Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status
Tax-exempt organizations constitute some of society's most re-
vered and important institutions: churches, universities, hospitals, ad-
vocacy groups, foundations, museums, and other organizations built to
serve the needs of the poor, advance the arts, and educate society.64
The IRS not only has power to determine what organizations qualify
for tax-exempt status, but it also has the power to revoke the tax-
Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-13 (2010) (Department of Education); 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10-135
(2010) (Environmental Protection Agency).
61 See NAT'L Sci. FOUND., ACADEMIC R&D EXPENDITURES: FY 2008, at 8 tbl.1 (2010),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10311/pdf/nsfIO311.pdf.
62 See LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX, at 30 (Amy N. Clocksin
et al. eds., 2005) ("No federal money has ever been lost because of an [Office of Civil Rights]
finding of a violation of Title IX."); Barbara Anne Murphy, Education: An Illusion for Women, 3
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 19, 53 (1993) ("Between 1972 and 1991, the Department of
Education did not revoke funding to one school due to gender discrimination in violation of Title
IX."); Leora Tanenbaum, Hey, Teach!, NATION, Feb 28, 1994, at 280, 282 ("Title IX, the 1972
federal statute outlawing sex discrimination in schools, has never been seriously enforced; it sits
in the books like a cruel joke. Neither the Education Department nor the Office of Civil Rights
has ever actively pursued its enforcement.").
63 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2007-08, at 30 (2009), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/
annual/ocr/annrpt2007-08/annrpt2007-08.pdf (reporting that the office initiated twenty-one com-
pliance reviews involving potential Title IX violations in fiscal year 2008).
64 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
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exempt status of an organization that fails to live up to its charitable
mission.65
A tax-exempt status often proves vital to fundraising. Once the
exemption is revoked, the organization can no longer solicit donations
with the promise that donors can write off the value of the donation
for tax purposes. 66 Some have gone so far as to equate revocation
with an organizational "death penalty. '67
Revocation has also become a political taboo. For the most part,
the IRS turns a blind eye to violations of the tax code that would
permit revocation. 68 The IRS has proved particularly squeamish, for
example, when it comes to churches willing to violate the prohibition
against endorsing political candidates.69 During the 2004 presidential
election cycle, there were a handful of well-publicized incidents of
nonprofit churches endorsing candidates.7 Although the IRS handed
out some warnings, it ultimately declined to impose any penalties.71
Since then, a number of churches have actively challenged the IRS to
revoke their exempt statuses. 72 Beginning with thirty-three churches
in 2008, the Alliance Defense Fund has organized an annual "Pulpit
65 Id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
66 With minor exceptions not pertinent here, taxpayers who wish to deduct the amount of
their charitable donations under § 170 may only take that deduction for money donated to orga-
nizations that meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3).
67 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 65 (2004).
68 See, e.g., NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NON-
PROFIT AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 6.06, at 84 (2006) (noting that the IRS seldom
revokes a nonprofit organization's tax-exempt status because of revocation's harsh conse-
quences); BERTRAND M. HARDING, JR., THE TAX LAW OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES § 9.1,
at 349 (3d ed. 2008) (observing that "it would be quite unusual for the IRS to attempt to revoke
a major educational institution's tax-exempt status"); GEORGE D. WEBSTER & HUGH K. WEB-
STER, THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS § 7.08, at 7-32.2 (release 64 2011) ("The IRS has shown an
inclination to impose the excise tax under section 4955 in lieu of revocation of exemption in
cases where the violation appears to be minor in relation to the organization's other exempt
purpose activities."); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Bur-
dens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009) ("To date the IRS has
resolved the vast majority of violations, whether involving houses of worship or statements from
the pulpit, through written advisories instead of imposing any penalty.").
69 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
70 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 68, at 1139 (discussing All Saints Church in Pasadena,
California).
71 Id.
72 See id. at 1139-40; Joy Powell, Warroad Church Preaches Politics as Part of Protest,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/
130951318.html (reporting on a Minnesota church that participated in the 2011 "Pulpit Freedom
Sunday" event).
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Freedom Sunday," which encourages pastors to preach about the
moral qualifications of candidates for political office; to date, the IRS
still has not pursued these violations.73
Only on rare occasions has the IRS revoked the nonprofit status
of a widely recognized organization. One of these rare occasions oc-
curred in 1976, when the IRS formally revoked Bob Jones University's
exempt status after the University was found to be discriminating ille-
gally on the basis of race.74 Although one could point to a handful of
other cases in which the IRS dismantled an active organization, this
taboo certainly grows stronger with time. In fact, about a decade ago,
Congress actually changed the law and gave the IRS additional regu-
latory tools in light of its unwillingness to exercise its revocation
power.75 Some in Congress speculated that the reason the IRS would
not pull the revocation trigger was because the penalty was too
harsh.76
C. Revocation of Broadcast Licenses
Congress has given the FCC a broad mandate to assure that
broadcast stations serve the "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity. ' 77 When the FCC finds that a station does not meet this public
interest standard, the regulatory tools at its disposal range from fines
to the revocation of a station's broadcast license.78
With its license revoked, a station has no legal means to broad-
cast, and thus the station's core business is destroyed. Many other
members of society also may feel the destructive power of a license
revocation. For example, there are many who would feel the impact
of the Fox network losing its licenses: it is not hard to imagine fans of
73 See Stephanie Strom, The Political Pulpit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at B1 (quoting
lawyers defending the churches as stating that "they are virtually certain [the IRS] has no contin-
uing audits of church political activity").
74 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983) (noting that the univer-
sity did not admit black students until 1971, and still excluded anyone in an interracial relation-
ship or who advocated interracial marriage in 1976); Rev. Rut. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230
("Therefore, a school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charita-
ble' within ... sections 170 and 501 (c) (3) of the Code ... and accordingly does not qualify as an
organization exempt from Federal income tax.").
75 H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 54-55 (1996); SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF H. COMM. ON
WAYS & MEANS, 103d CONG., 2D SESS., REP. ON REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE TAX RULES Gov-
ERNINO PUBLIC CHARITIES 17 (Comm. Print 1994).
76 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103d CONG., 2D SESS.,
REP. ON REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE TAX RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC CHARITIES 16.
77 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2) (2006).
78 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a).
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American Idol using their dialing and texting skills to deluge Congress
with complaints.
Revocation of a broadcast license also serves as a good example
of a political taboo. In fact, to date, the FCC has never revoked the
license of a commercial television or radio broadcaster due to content
regulation.79 From time to time, however, the FCC has threatened to
revoke licenses to get a broadcaster's content in line with FCC stan-
dards. For example, after a public firestorm related to the controver-
sial Janet Jackson "wardrobe malfunction" during the 2004 Super
Bowl halftime show,80 the FCC pursued a repeat offender of FCC
standards, Howard Stern.81 Ultimately, instead of risking its license,
Clear Channel Communications-which broadcasts Stern's syndi-
cated talk show-paid $495,000 in fines82 and removed Stern from the
dial for a time.83 This move actually facilitated Stern's decision to
move to satellite radio, which is outside the FCC's regulatory reach.84
The reason for the taboo surrounding this regulatory tool cer-
tainly has much to do with the entities that the FCC regulates. Com-
mercial broadcasters represent some of the most influential
institutions in the country, and that influence extends into the halls of
Congress.85 It also seems disproportionate to revoke a station's li-
cense for the contents of a single show, let alone for a few episodes.
Additionally, it is possible that the FCC may see this as a political
79 See Matthew A. Klopp, Constitutional Malfunction: Does the FCC's Authority to Revoke
a Broadcaster's License Violate the First Amendment?, 13 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 309, 310
(2005) ("Although the FCC has never fully exercised its statutory enforcement powers, it has
repeatedly warned broadcasters of its willingness to revoke a broadcaster's license for indecent
broadcasts.").
80 Id. at 309-10.
81 Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 6773, 6780 (2004) ("We remind licen-
sees that serious, repeated cases of indecency violations could be subject to license revocation.");
see also FCC Indecency Fines, 1970-2004, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
business/graphics/web-fcc970.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
82 Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 6773, 6780 (2004).
83 See Klopp, supra note 79, at 329; Howard Stern Makes His Debut on Satellite Radio,
Uses Expletive, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.comllife/peo-
ple/2006-01-09-stern-debutx.htm.
84 See Howard Stern Makes His Debut on Satellite Radio, Uses Expletive, supra note 83; see
also Clay Clavert, The First Amendment, the Media and the Culture Wars: Eight Important Les-
sons From 2004 About Speech, Censorship, Science and Public Policy, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 325,
357 (2005).
85 See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and Re-
demption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. Sc. & TECH. 1, 3 (2005)
(discussing broadcasters' power and influence).
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taboo due to its desire to avoid First Amendment challenges from
broadcasters.8 6
D. Federal Regulation of State Driver's Licenses
States have traditionally had broad autonomy to determine the
makeup of and qualifications for driver's licenses. However, in 2005,
Congress stepped into this policy area by passing the REAL ID Act.8 7
This Act focuses on reducing license forgeries and increasing the stan-
dards for drivers to prove their identities before receiving a license
(e.g., by requiring a birth certificate, social security card, and photo
identification)8 A state's failure to comply with the Act's require-
ments may trigger federal sanctions, including the government refus-
ing to honor that state's license for "official purposes," such as passing
through security checkpoints in airports and gaining entry into federal
buildings.8 9
The REAL ID Act is an example of a regulatory tool with a de-
structive force that is extreme in its scope. Sanctions under the Act
would result in a large portion of a state's population not having ade-
quate identification for commercial air travel or to enter federal build-
ings. This would impinge on a citizen's ability to travel and
meaningfully participate in many aspects of government-both of
which are fundamental features of federal citizenship. 90 The scope of
the destructive power of the regulatory tool is broad-only those
within state government can opt to comply with the mandates of the
86 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to a First Amendment challenge to
the FCC indecency regulations by Fox and other television networks, in which the Second Cir-
cuit held the regulations unconstitutionally vague. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d
317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).
87 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
88 See id. § 202(c)(1), 119 Stat. at 312-13.
89 Id. §§ 201(3), 202(a)(1), 119 Stat. at 312; 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2011).
90 Racial discrimination by segregated inns, hotels, and restaurants was one of the reasons
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241. 252-53 (1964). The importance of travel to a person's ability to access economic
and social opportunities, and thus its impact on interstate commerce, was the basis to which
Congress and later the Court tied the enactment of the Act. See id. (detailing how interference
with travel divorces people from participation in numerous social and economic activities). The
Court has long considered the right to travel as a fundamental right. See Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 177-78 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring). The inability to enter federal government
buildings could deprive a person of due process and equal protection under the law. See, e.g.,
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (finding that the right of physical access to courts is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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REAL ID Act,91 but all citizens of the state might suffer. Barring all
state citizens without a passport or other federal identification from
these activities is obviously a political taboo. In addition to the impact
on a state's citizens, this taboo relates to the federal intrusion into a
policy area traditionally reserved for states. 92 In fact, to protest this
intrusion, about half of the states have passed laws or resolutions
aimed at voicing protest of or even refusing compliance with the
REAL ID Act.93 Objections voiced by the states include concerns
that the Act is an unfunded mandate, 94 an identity theft hazard,95 an
excessive burden on citizens,96 and a de facto requirement for a na-
tional identification card,97 to name a few.
E. Laws Linked to Federal Highway Funds
At times Congress has conditioned the receipt of federal highway
funds on states taking certain actions. When Congress does this, it is
more than a prod. In fiscal year 2009, the federal highway funds dis-
tributed to states amounted to more than $42.8 billion.98
The federal government eventually found ways to leverage the
power that accompanies such a large pot of money to coerce states to
comply with Congress's will in a number of ways. For example, in the
1960s and 1970s, Congress made federal highway dollars contingent
on states passing laws that require motorcyclists to wear safety hel-
mets. 99 The Clean Air Act'00 allows the Environmental Protection
91 See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202(c)(1), 119 Stat. at 312.
92 See, e.g., Opposition Voices, REALNIGHTMARE.ORG, http://realnightmare.org/opposition
/9/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (quoting various government officials and commentators who
argue that the Act interferes with principles of federalism).
93 Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States, REALNIGHTMARE.ORG, http://www.realnightmare
.org/news/105/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
94 See Act of Apr. 18, 2007, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 333; H.R. Res. 4, 2009 Gen. Sess., 2009
Utah Laws 2577; S. Con. Res. 16, 86th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2007 Ark. Acts 579.
95 See Act of Jan. 1, 2010, ch. 432, 2009 Or. Laws 1134; Act No. 807, 2008 La. Acts 3059; S.
4, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007).
96 See Act of June 18,2007, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2007 Tenn. Priv. Acts at ccliv; H.R.J. Res.
27, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2007 Il. Laws 10,140; S. Con. Res. 4040, 60th Leg. Assemb., 2007 N.D.
Laws 2110.
97 See Act of Apr. 17, 2007, 2007 Mont. Laws 916; S. Con. Res. 7, 83rd Leg. (S.D. 2008);
H.R. J. Res. 07-1047, 66th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
98 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., COMPARISON OF FEDERAL HIGHWAY TRUST FUND HIGHWAY
ACCOUNT RECEIPTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE STATES AND FEDERAL-AID APPORTIONMENTS AND
ALLOCATIONS FROM THE HIGHWAY ACCOUNT FISCAL YEARS 1957-2009 (2010), available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2009/pdf/fe22l.pdf.
99 Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731, 732-33 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2006)); 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1969).
100 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515 (2006).
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Agency ("EPA") to pull federal highway funds if a state fails to com-
ply with the Act's national air quality standards. 10 1 Additionally, Con-
gress directed the Department of Transportation to withhold up to ten
percent of federal highway funds from states that did not set their
drinking age at twenty-one. 0 2
The destructive power of revoking federal highway funds is im-
pressive in its scope. States unwilling to capitulate to the federal man-
date lose a valuable source of federal support. Congress understands
that this is a substantial stick: "[B]ecause federal funds account for
ninety-five percent of a state's transportation budget, highway funds
provide the leverage for Congress to achieve its goals."'10 3
Revoking highway funding may be politically taboo for a number
of reasons, and a concrete example helps frame this discussion. Con-
sider the ability of EPA to revoke highway funds when states fail to
comply with certain provisions of the Clean Air Act. °4 One reason
that EPA might be reticent to employ these sanctions is because they
can impose significant collateral damage on taxpayers, or in the event
that investments in transportation infrastructure are not forthcoming,
commuters within the impacted area. Furthermore, because much of
the Clean Air Act relies on cooperative federalism, loss of highway
funds may make it more difficult for EPA to achieve its goals of in-
creasing air quality. Lastly, states are powerful players in the political
arena, which makes using the stick politically difficult.
F. Institutional Backstops
Congress sometimes entrusts a regulatory program to more than
one agency or delegates powers to both federal and state entities.105
When Congress's mandates call for cooperation, it makes sense for
Congress to split up tasks and to create an institutional backstop if the
cooperation fails to materialize.
For example, statutes based on cooperative federalism often en-
trust states with particular tasks. However, in the event that a state
fails to deliver, the federal government is instructed to step in1°6 This
101 Id. §§ 7410(m), 7509(b)(1).
102 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
103 Denis Binder, The Spending Clause As a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A
Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 160 (2001).
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7509(b)(1).
105 See, e.g., id. § 7410 (requiring states to develop plans to reduce air pollution and author-
izing EPA to promulgate a federal antipollution plan if a state fails to submit a plan or its plan
falls short of federal requirements).
106 See id.
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is common in environmental law. The Clean Air Act requires the fed-
eral government to set national air quality standards 0 7 and leaves it
largely to states to determine their individual compliance methods.', 8
If a state fails to meet the federal standard, the Clean Air Act leaves
room for the federal government to step in and to complete the state's
regulatory task.109 This same sort of institutional structure also char-
acterizes parts of the Clean Water Act, o10 the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act,"' and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act.12
Environmental law also has examples of backstop provisions
dealing with relations between federal agencies. The Clean Water Act
primarily entrusts the Army Corps of Engineers to oversee regulation
of the dredging and filling of water bodies by allowing the Corps to
issue permits to fill wetlands.1 3 In the event that EPA finds that a
Corps permit fails to meet the statutory standards, however, EPA is
given the power to veto permits provided by the Corps." 4
When institutional backstops kick in, they override the status quo
put in place by congressional legislation. Depending on what power is
being supplanted and how it is supplanted, the destructive scope may
be significant. In a frequently recounted example from the 1970s,
EPA stepped in to address Los Angeles's air quality problems."5 To
push the greater Los Angeles area toward compliance, EPA at-
tempted to implement gas rationing as part of its solution." 6
Regulatory backstops are by their nature a political taboo be-
cause, if resorted to regularly, the backstops would set the institu-
tional structure provided for by Congress on its head. Of course,
crossing Congress can cause problems related to congressional over-
sight and judicial review.
107 Id. § 7409.
108 Id. § 7410(a).
109 Id. § 7410(c).
110 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1253 (2006).
1'1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6905, 6948.
112 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2006).
113 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
114 Id. § 1344(c).
115 See Barry T. Woods, Comment, Environmental Land Use, Indirect Source Controls and
California's South Coast Plan; Is the Day of Attainment Coming?, 23 ENVTL. L. 1273, 1284
(1993).
116 See id.
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G. School Closures and the No Child Left Behind Act
When Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
("NCLBA"),1 7 some complained that a culture of lax enforcement
pervaded the Department of Education.118 With the NCLBA, Con-
gress provided the Department with a new arsenal of regulatory tools
to help deliver the promises of the statute. Under the NCLBA,
schools that do not make "adequate yearly progress"' 119 may face vari-
ous penalties including the dramatic sanctions of shutting down
schools and abolishing school districts.120
Closing schools and districts clearly has a destructive impact on
the entities that it regulates. From the perspective of a school or dis-
trict, shutting down the school is a form of obliteration. There is noth-
ing more one could do to punish a school or a district. It effectively
serves as an institutional death penalty.
Given the number of people who have complained that the
NCLBA forces teachers to teach to annual assessment tests,'121 it
seems that many believe it is possible that an administration may re-
sort to these extreme regulatory tools. However, even when the
NCLBA allows for extreme sanctions, administrators rarely employ
them.2 2 They are a political taboo because, in addition to their poten-
tial for collateral damage, this regulatory tool also impacts a policy
area that is traditionally reserved for the province of state govern-
ment.123 There may also be a sense that destroying the target does not
117 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006)).
118 Abigail Aikens, Being Choosy: An Analysis of Public School Choice Under No Child
Left Behind, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 233,250 (2006); William L. Taylor, What Are the Likely Impacts
of the Accountability Movement on Minority Children?: Title I as an Instrument for Achieving
Desegregation and Equal Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (as-
serting the department "has been permeated by a culture of non-enforcement").
119 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2).
120 Id. § 6316(c)(10)(C).
121 See, e.g., Nora Brunelle, Political Education: An Analysis of the Policy and Politics Be-
hind Utah's Opposition to No Child Left Behind, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 419, 435 (noting criticism
that the law's provisions "force teachers to 'teach to the test,' rather than to the needs of their
students"); Ryan S. Vincent, Note, No Child Left Behind, Only the Arts and Humanities: Emerg-
ing Inequalities in Education Fifty Years After Brown, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 143 (2004) (same).
122 Amy M. Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No Child Left
Behind to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. REV 667, 682, 694 (2004) (noting that the federal gov-
ernment had failed to enforce the NCLBA during its first two years); see also Taylor, supra note
118, at 1759-60 (providing examples of hesitancy to enforce the NCLBA).
123 See Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes,
12 WIDENER L. REV. 637, 643 (2006); Sarah D. Greenberger, Comment, Enforceable Rights, No
Child Left Behind, and Political Patriotism: A Case for Open-Minded Section 1983 Jurisprudence,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2005).
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improve the overall education in a state. It just leaves the state with
one fewer school and many upset parents, teachers, and students.
H. Criminal Prosecutions
Up to this point, I have provided examples of agencies using ad-
ministrative penalties. Additionally, regulatory nukes may have a
criminal component to them. Many regulatory programs have select
criminal sanctions for particularly egregious violations. For example,
criminal enforcement of some provisions of corporate law, environ-
mental law, and tax law are highly unusual and seem to qualify as
regulatory nukes. The best way to illustrate the analogy between
criminal sanctions and regulatory nukes is by looking at a concrete
example.
Consider the criminal prosecution of and resulting demise of Ar-
thur Andersen. Up until several years ago, Arthur Andersen was one
of the world's largest accounting firms. 124 During its nearly century-
long existence, Arthur Andersen spent a great deal of time building a
brand that signified accuracy and integrity.125 In the 1990s and the
early 2000s that reputation came crashing down as the firm was tan-
gled up in a number of public fiascos, including a controversial audit
of Enron.126
As the firm increasingly became embroiled in the collapse of En-
ron, two Andersen employees ordered others at Andersen to shred
various Enron-related documents. 127 The Department of Justice not
only went after the responsible Andersen employees but also brought
an obstruction of justice claim against the firm itself.128
The Department of Justice has tremendous power to destroy cor-
porations by prosecuting them. For Arthur Andersen, the destruction
did not even take a final conviction. By the time the Supreme Court
overturned Arthur Andersen's convictions, 129 it was merely a shell of
its former self. The indictment alone was enough to push the firm
124 See Pamela H. Bucy, Why Punish?: Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 1301 (2007).
125 Ken Brown & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Andersen's Fall from Grace Is a Tale of Greed and
Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at Al.
126 Id.
127 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 700-01 (2005).
128 Id. at 702; see also Albert D. Spalding, Jr. & Mary Ashby Morrison, Criminal Liability
for Document Shredding After Arthur Andersen LLP, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 647, 650 (2006).
129 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708.
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over the edge.130 The destructive force of the prosecution was not
only felt by the firm, but also by its more than 28,000 employees 131 and
its owners.
Corporations are rarely prosecuted criminally.1 32  Prosecuting
corporations is a political taboo, presumably because of the collateral
damage associated therewith-a few employees cost thousands of em-
ployees their jobs and many investors their investments. 133 Although
the story of the demise of Arthur Andersen is one for the history
books as a rare prosecution, the strategy of threatening to indict a
corporation is a much more common way for prosecutors to secure its
cooperation.134
I. Presidential Regulatory Nukes and Desegregation
It is not just agencies that have access to regulatory nukes. The
President controls several of them. Among the most striking powers
delegated to the President are those found in the Insurrection Act.1 35
The Act allows the President to call in armed forces in the event of
political insurrection, domestic violence, or an attempt to overthrow
the government.1 36
Presidents only rarely unleash the full power of the Act. Most
famously, President Eisenhower employed the Insurrection Act to de-
segregate a high school in Little Rock, Arkansas.1 37 After Brown v.
Board of Education,138 the South inched toward desegregating
schools. In 1957, Central High School had planned to enroll nine
black students. 139 Due to public clamor in Little Rock surrounding
the issue in the summer of 1957, President Eisenhower fielded a ques-
130 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Cit-
izenship," 76 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 979, 981 (2002).
131 See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Ander-
sen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006).
132 Simons, supra note 130, at 986.
133 See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation
and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
77, 98 (2006).
134 See id. at 99; Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 925 (2009).
135 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-336 (2006).
136 Id. § 333.
137 William C. Banks, Providing "Supplemental Security"-the Insurrection Act and the Mil-
itary Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT'L SECURrTY L. & POL'Y 39, 69 n.162
(2009).
138 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139 Wiley A. Branton, Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 J. NEGRO
EDuc. 250, 261 (1983).
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tion about whether he would deploy federal troops to assist in deseg-
regation. 140 He responded, "I can't imagine any set of circumstances
that would ever induce me to send federal troops . . . into any area to
enforce orders of a federal court, because I believe that [the] common
sense of America will never require it."' 141
What Eisenhower did not anticipate was that Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus would deploy troops of the state's National Guard to
thwart desegregation attempts in Arkansas and that an angry mob
would accompany those troops. 142 Although Governor Faubus ulti-
mately withdrew the troops,'1 43 disturbances both inside and outside
the school kept the black students from attending school for more
than a few hours.144 President Eisenhower resolved that the school
would not be integrated without federal intervention, and on Septem-
ber 24, he signed an Executive Order that federalized the Arkansas
National Guard and sent the 101st Airborne Division to Little
Rock.145 The nine students made it through the school year with the
help of federalized National Guard troops. 146
The power of this regulatory tool is impressive both in its impact
and, in this case, its scope. Despite a recalcitrant governor and a state
unwilling to admit black students into what had been all-white
schools, President Eisenhower was able to facilitate desegregation. A
Little Rock citizen at the time referred to the situation as "living in a
police state."'147 In a limited way, the description is accurate. How-
ever, if sending in the 101st Airborne Division had not proved suffi-
cient, President Eisenhower was willing to deploy additional military
force: his order actually authorized the Secretary of Defense to deploy
''any or all of the units of the National Guard of the United States and
of the Air National Guard of the United States within the State of
Arkansas to serve in the active military service of the United States
for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders.' 1 48
This order sounded the death knell for school segregation in Little
Rock.
140 James W. Vander Zanden, The Impact of Little Rock, 35 J. EDUC. Soc. 381, 382 (1962)
(quoting President's news conference held July 17, 1957).
141 Id.
142 See Branton, supra note 139, at 261-62.
143 ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TuRN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT
SHOCKED THE NATION 158 (2007).
144 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12 (1958).
145 See Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 89 (Supp. 1957).
146 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
147 VIRGIL T. BLOSSOM, IT HAS HAPPENED HERE 3 (1959).
148 Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 89.
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President Eisenhower also recognized that he was dealing with a
political taboo and made clear that he understood this from the min-
ute he issued the Order. In his televised speech to the Nation regard-
ing his decision, he explained, "The proper use of the powers of the
Executive Branch to enforce the orders of a Federal Court is limited
to extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Manifestly, such an
extreme situation has been created in Little Rock."'1 49 Some of the
factors that caused him to rely on the Insurrection Act to enforce the
orders of federal courts included his duty to uphold the law, the need
to avoid anarchy and mob rule, the failure of state and local govern-
ment to restore social order, and the need to protect the reputation of
the United States abroad.150
J. The NCAA "Death Penalty" Sanction
To be sure, regulatory nukes are not a tool available just to the
federal government. One example well outside the federal bureau-
cracy is a power held by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") in its oversight of athletic programs within higher educa-
tion institutions.
The NCAA promulgates and enforces rules governing college
athletics.151 In the event that NCAA staff finds that a school has re-
peatedly committed major violations of its rules, the NCAA may em-
ploy a number of regulatory sanctions, including banning a school
from participating in a particular sport for up to two years. 152 Banning
teams from playing is known as the "death penalty."'15 3
At least when it comes to sports programs recognizable to the
average sports fan, the only time that the NCAA has prohibited a
school from participating in a sport came in 1987, when the NCAA
cancelled the football season of Southern Methodist University
("SMU").154 The reason for the sanction was that during 1985 and
1986, SMU had found a way to channel between $50 and $725 each
149 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Address to the American People on the
Situation in Little Rock (Sept. 24, 1957), in DEBATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1945-1968, at 60, 63 (Steven F. Lawson & Charles Payne eds., 1998).
150 Id. at 62-64.
151 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2009-10 NCAA DIvISIoN I MANUAL: CONSTITU-
TION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS 1 (2009), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/p-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx.
152 See id. at 293.
153 See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty:
How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 987 (1987).
154 NCAA Comm. on Infractions, SMU Football Program Suspended One Year for Infrac-
tions, NCAA NEWS, Mar. 4, 1987, at 13.
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month to a number of players on the team, amounting in total to
$61,000.155 This violation came on the heels of other SMU misconduct
and only after the NCAA discovered that SMU lied about the
violations. 156
This regulatory tool can debilitate its targets. In SMU's case, the
NCAA prohibited the football team from playing in scrimmages or
games in 1987 and cancelled about half of its games, including all
home games, in 1988.157 The penalty put SMU's football program in a
tailspin. In fact, a full fifteen years after the penalty was imposed,
commentators noted that SMU was still affected by the sanction.158
Although a recent scandal involving a booster paying and offer-
ing other perks to University of Miami football players raised the pos-
sibility of its use again, the NCAA has not imposed the penalty since
the SMU episode.159 In a fifteen-year period, twenty other college
programs qualified for the "ultimate sanction," but all were spared. 160
According to Sports Illustrated, the reason that the NCAA dropped
the "death bomb" could be found in the "athletic rubble" at SMU. 161
A political taboo has certainly developed around this regulatory
tool. According to former SMU coach Phil Bennett, the NCAA's
"death penalty" was "like the atomic bomb. The NCAA did it one
time and created devastation beyond belief-and it's never going to
be done again.' 62 Additionally, when one team suffers, other teams
in the same conference also take a hit because athletic conference ri-
vals share revenues and rely on each other for competition.
As this and the other examples of regulatory nukes show, an en-
tity with a regulatory nuke wields a powerful weapon. As shown in
the remainder of the Article, by examining regulatory nukes through
the lens of game theory, we can achieve a greater understanding of
how agencies use regulatory nukes, how regulatory targets respond,
and what costs are related to agencies going nuclear.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Tim Layden, The Loneliest Losers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 18, 2002, at 69.
159 See, e.g., Erik Brady & Steve Wieberg, Cloud over Miami, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2011,
at lA.
160 Layden, supra note 158, at 69.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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Il. A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO REGULATORY NUKES
Schelling's insights about conflict and war have proven extremely
useful. In fact, these insights made up the centerpiece of the Nobel
Prize Committee's decision to make him a Nobel laureate.t 63 The
Nobel Committee found that his work made an important contribu-
tion to game theory. 164 Particularly important was the way in which he
framed noncooperative game theory, which moved beyond the zero-
sum games that had monopolized game theory at the time.165 In sig-
nificant part, the way he conceptualized game theory broadened the
reach of the tool and paved the way for game theory to take hold
across the social sciences.1 66
Schelling's motivations for much of his early work on nuclear
strategy are relevant to the current discussion. Contemporary with
Schelling's writing, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened the
United States with the words, "We will bury you,"'1 6 7 and later
pounded a shoe on the podium while addressing the United Na-
tions.1 68 There was real fear that the Cold War would heat up to the
point of nuclear war.169
In Schelling's environment, it is hard to imagine a more pressing
need than understanding nuclear strategy. Schelling was not con-
cerned with the question of when to launch nuclear weapons or how
to survive an attack. Rather, he wanted to understand how to use
nuclear weapons before they were launched, how they could be used
in bargaining, and how to make nuclear threats in a way that others
would take seriously.1 70
In this context, Schelling educated military strategists on the
great value of keeping the nuclear bomb a taboo of warfare. He
163 See Jorgen Weibull, Chairman, Econ. Prize Comm., Nobel Prize Award Ceremony Pres-
entation Speech (Dec. 10, 2005), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laure-
ates/2005/presentation-speech.html.
164 Id.
165 See KUNGL. VETENSKAPSAKEDEMIEN: THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
ROBERT AUMANN'S AND THOMAS SCHELLING'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY: ANALYSES
OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 1-2 (2005).
166 See id. ("The work of... Thomas C. Schelling[ ] was essential in developing non-coop-
erative game theory further and bringing it to bear on major questions in the social sciences.")
167 See Harold P. Southerland, Law, Literature, and History, 28 VT. L. REV. 1, 50 (2003).
168 Id.
169 Thomas C. Schelling, An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima 365 (Dec.
8, 2005), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/2005/schelling-
lecture.pdf
170 See generally KUNGL. VETENSKAPSAKEDEMIEN: THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, supra note 165.
[Vol. 80:442
WHEN AGENCIES GO NUCLEAR
showed how elevating the threat of nuclear warfare could be lever-
aged in diplomacy to get concessions and reduce the chance of war-
fare.171 He also illustrated that in order to keep the country safe, it
was much more important to learn to communicate threats of an at-
tack rather than to draw up top-secret plans about how to annihilate
the enemy.172 Fittingly, since his thinking on the subject has proven
central to understanding and maintaining the nuclear taboo, the first
words of his Nobel Lecture were, "The most spectacular event of the
past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty
years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger."'1 73
I cannot pretend that the need to understand regulatory nukes
remotely approaches the need to understand actual nuclear weapons.
However, the common perception of regulatory nukes needs to ex-
pand in the same way that Schelling expanded society's knowledge of
nuclear strategy. We need a more nuanced understanding of how
agencies actually use regulatory nukes and how they potentially could
be used.
Although this sort of thinking is often neglected, when it is ad-
vanced it very often focuses on whether or not the agency has
launched the regulatory nuke and the chances of it happening again.
Sometimes these discussions will paint the regulatory nuke as nothing
more than a dud. Other times we might find perpetuation of tales of
how a regulatory agency left a target in ashes.
What we do not hear enough about is what falls between a dud
and a regulatory Armageddon. In between these poles we find most
cases, and these cases are driven by threats, risks, and posturing. This
Part attempts to set out some groundwork for thinking about how
agencies use regulatory nukes, and presents a simplified game similar
to those that have grown out of Schelling's insights and are often used
to describe nuclear strategy today.
Game theory is well suited to analyzing strategic interactions,
such as the handling of a regulatory nuke. Game theory rests on a
number of typical assumptions: (1) there are a set of players in the
game, (2) each of the players has various strategies from which to
choose, and (3) for each strategy available there is a corresponding
payoff received by the players.174
171 See id. at 6-7.
172 See id. at 9-10.
173 Schelling, supra note 169, at 365.
174 See DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 10 (1990).
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The simplified game used in this Article consists of two players: a
regulatory agency with a regulatory nuke and the potential regulatory
target, which-depending on the regulatory nuke-could be an indi-
vidual, an organization, a group of organizations, a segment of society,
or a sector of the economy. In the example discussed in the Introduc-
tion, where Congress gave the Department of Defense the power to
revoke any university's federal funding in the event that any part of
the university refused to give military recruiters the same access it
provided other employers, the agency was the Department of Defense
and the target was a particular university.
The strategies in our game are the choices facing each of the play-
ers in relation to regulatory nukes. The game focuses on four strategic
interactions. First, there is a question as to whether the agency will
threaten to launch its regulatory nuke. The threat is often the major
way agencies get mileage out of their regulatory nukes. Second, we
focus on the potential target's response to the threat. The major ques-
tion encountered here is whether the regulatory target will comply
with the agency's command. In the event that a threat has not been
issued, the regulatory target may nonetheless choose to comply with
(or violate) the regulatory mandate on the books. Third, this game
focuses on whether the agency launches its regulatory nuke in the
event that the target defies the agency's threat or violates the law.
When a regulated target complies, the model sensibly assumes that an
agency will not launch a regulatory nuke.175 Fourth, the target may
opt to retaliate if it is so capable.
The type of game relied upon in this Article is an "extensive
form" game. The visual representation of an extensive form game
looks like a decision tree. Extensive form games incorporate a tempo-
ral factor into the game. 176 For example, the game takes into account
that an agency first decides if it will make a threat, and then the poten-
tial target must decide how to respond to the threat.177 Given these
parameters, the game tree for this game is shown in Figure 2.
175 In game theory, this is known as a dominant strategy: a "course of action that out-
performs all others no matter what the other players do." AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 59 (1991). Typically, dominant strategies eliminate options from consideration
from game trees. This is why we do not consider further how agencies respond when a regulated
entity complies.
176 See KREPS, supra note 174, at 13.
177 See id.
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Figure 2. Game Played by an Agency with a Regulatory Nuke
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The outcome of a player employing a given strategy is the payoff.
An agency making a threat gets a completely diffs.'ao depend-
ing on, for example, whether or not a regulatory target heeds its
threats. To decide what move to make, the players look ahead and
calibrate their strategies based on their best speculation as to how the
game will play out. Game theory also assumes that actors are ra-
tional, at least to the extent that the players would choose a Strategy
with higher payoffs over strategies with lower payoffs. 178 This is not to
say that players always have perfect information, but rather that with
their available information, they try to do their best to make them-
selves better off. 179 In other words, if an agency believes that a target
will comply with a threat, it will play the game accordingly. Similarly,
the agency is much more likely to be squeamish about making a threat
if the agency believes that eventually the target might retaliate.
Although much more could be said about game theory, this brief
discussion should sufficiently lay the groundwork for the game used in
this Article. Parts IV-VII discuss each of the major decision points
introduced by the game, and begin by discussing the decision of
whether or not to leverage threats.
IV. THREATS
The first decision point that the game presents is the decision of
whether or not the agency should threaten to launch its regulatory
178 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 4 (2d ed. 1980).
179 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175, at 33.
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nuke. "A threat is a response rule that punishes others who fail to
cooperate with [the person making the threat]. '180 Schelling noted
that "[s]uccessful threats are those that do not have to be carried
out."'' As President John F. Kennedy said of nuclear weapons, "To-
day the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons ac-
quired for the purpose of making sure we never need them is essential
to the keeping of peace. ' 182 Carrying out threats imposes a higher
cost to everyone involved. 18 3 In this way, "a promise is different from
a threat .... [A] promise is costly when it succeeds, and a threat is
costly when it fails.' 84 So, of course, the agency hopes that the target
will buckle when threatened. The art of making a threat to launch a
regulatory nuke is in making the threat credible and serious enough
that it manipulates the target's behavior by altering the target's belief
about how the agency will act if the target does not comply. As a
reminder of how the threat fits within the larger game, the threat deci-
sion node is highlighted in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Regulatory Nuke Game-ThreatsT are Target
Regulatory Backs Down
Agency Launches
Makes Thret Nuke
MkThet Target ReisNo
Aggency
180 Id. at 125.
181 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 10.
182 John F. Kennedy, American University Commencement Address (June 10, 1961), avail-
able at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/John /20F. /*2OKennedy /20- /20
American% 20University %20Conimencement.pdf.
183 This is reminiscent of parents saying, "This is going to hurt me more than it is going to
hurt you." Here and with other threats, both parties bear a cost when having to make good on a
threat.
184 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 177.
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Often, when regulatory nukes are discussed by scholars and prac-
titioners, the discussion of threats is missing.185 This is because the
literature often conflates launching regulatory nukes with using them.
This leads students and practitioners to misjudge how agencies oper-
ate. While studying environmental law in law school, I came to be-
lieve that I would be extremely unlikely to encounter the EPA veto of
a wetlands dredge-and-fill permit discussed above.186 However, a few
months into practice, I was involved in a case where EPA threatened
the very thing I had written off as a red herring. I remember going
back to my class notes and textbook and shaking my head, thinking
that I had encountered a statistical anomaly right out of the gate. Al-
though EPA and the regulatory target ultimately negotiated a deal,
the impression I had as a student was still wrong. The threat to use
the regulatory nuke drove the resolution of that entire regulatory con-
flict. Launching a regulatory nuke is just one of many ways that an
agency may use it.
Of course, it is often difficult to determine how often an agency
threatens to use a regulatory nuke. Take the EPA veto just discussed
as an example. Between 1972 and 2010, EPA only vetoed thirteen
dredge-and-fill permits. 187 This seems hardly worth mentioning given
that between 1988 and 2010, the Army Corps of Engineers processed
more than 1.3 million permit applications. 188 Yet, focusing on the
number of times this particular regulatory nuke was launched misses
the larger picture.
Unlike many of the regulatory weapons that agencies are given, it
is often difficult to make credible threats with regulatory nukes. Be-
cause regulatory nukes carry so much punch and because of the politi-
cal taboo surrounding them, it is not always easy for agencies to make
threats that seem realistic. As Schelling said in the context of nuclear
weapons, "Saying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if it is
true, saying so does not always make it believed."'189 Big threats often
sound like big bluffs. The very things that make the power of the
regulatory nuke difficult to ignore may make it difficult to execute the
threat. As two prominent game theorists have noted, the threat to
185 This does not mean that scholars have not focused on the role of threats at all within the
administrative context. For a particularly insightful discussion of how agencies use threats to
invoke action, see Noah, supra note 20, at 873-941.
186 See supra Part I.F.
187 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACT: SECTION 404(c) "VETO AUTHORIry"
(n.d.), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/404c.pdf.
188 Id.
189 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 35.
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launch an actual nuclear weapon may prove "too big to be credible,
too big to carry out, and too serious to stake a reputation over."'190
With regulatory nukes, launching the weapon may become the fodder
for news stories, the rallying cry of industries, the basis of lawsuits,
and the subject of congressional hearings. Within this context it cer-
tainly rings true that "[t]he size of the threat can be a problem" be-
cause "bigger threats cost more ... than small ones."' 191
One of the major contributions of Schelling's work was to help us
understand how we might finesse those threats that do not seem credi-
ble to make them more believable. According to Schelling, a threat's
credibility may depend on the costs and risks associated with fulfill-
ment for the party making the threat; therefore, a party's commitment
to fulfilling the threat is key. 92 Some examples include (1) stretching
of a "tripwire" across the enemy's path of advance, (2) making fulfill-
ment a matter of national honor and prestige, and (3) placing respon-
sibility for fulfillment in the hands of "those whose resolution is
strongest."193
The next Section lays out six major themes that run throughout
Schelling's work and provides a pathway to turn threats that seem like
cheap talk into credible commitments. The Section also discusses the
relevance of these tools to regulatory nukes.
A. Surrendering Control
With any large threat, like that of launching an actual nuclear
weapon or a regulatory nuke, the problem of making the threat credi-
ble can be substantial. In the days of the Cold War, Schelling noted
that the United States was facing this difficulty in trying to make its
threats believable.194 On the one hand, he noted that the leaders of
the then-Soviet Union could act unstably: he pointed to Nikita
Khrushchev's erratic behavior and hot temperament as an example. 195
190 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175, at 137. Note that Schelling's writing is mostly, but
not entirely, compatible with this insight. Although Schelling is known for his scholarship sur-
rounding the art of making credible commitments, he has also stated, for example, that
a threat that is 'too big' is likely to be superfluous rather than costly. If I threaten
to blow us both to bits when it would have been sufficient to threaten our discom-
fort, you'll likely still comply; since I have neither to discomfort us nor to kill us,
the error costs nothing.
SCHELLINO, supra note 178, at 177.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 6.
193 Id.
194 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 38.
195 Id. at 39.
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Schelling argued that this instability worked to make Khrushchev's
threats all the more believable-one could believe that shoe-thumping
Khrushchev would launch his weapons. 196 Khrushchev's erratic be-
havior made his "[w]e will bury you" ' 197 threat all the more compelling.
On the other hand, the electorate of the United States demanded
leaders that were more stable. Yet when it came to making threats, "it
[did] not always help to be, or believed to be, fully rational, cool-
headed, and in control of oneself or one's country." 198 Stated in an-
other way, what is unthinkable for a stable person might not prove
unthinkable for a hothead or an unstable person. Put into more mod-
ern terms, there is little doubt that the behavior of Kim Jong I1 or
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made their countries' nuclear programs all
the more threatening. A goal of Schelling's work was to find ways
that leaders could pose credible threats without making the world be-
lieve the leaders were unstable.199
1. Surrendering Control by Deterrent Threats
Making threats credible is often difficult because "[t]he distinc-
tive character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a contin-
gency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency
occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party's be-
havior. 2 00 One way to make the threat credible is to allow the poten-
tial target to control its own destiny.2 1 Professors Avirash Dixit and
Barry Nalebuff compare this sort of strategy to an automatic trigger.2 2
To the extent that the one possessing a weapon can allow the target to
control the weapon, he removes from the equation the guesswork of
whether the threat of launching the weapon is credible. An automatic
trigger often works "because it makes aggression tantamount to sui-
cide. '20 3 Just as the aptly named Peacekeeper Missile suggests, the
whole idea of deterrence is that launching the weapons will not be-
come necessary. 204
196 Id.
197 See Southerland, supra note 167, at 50.
198 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 37.
199 Id. at 38-39.
200 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 123.
201 DIxIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175, at 156.
202 Id. at 155-56.
203 Id. at 156.
204 The Peacekeeper Missile is a now-defunct "intercontinental-range, silo-based, solid pro-
pellant ballistic missile" developed as a way to increase U.S. "counterstrike capabilities against
the Soviet Union" in the late 1970s. Peacekeeper, MISSILETHREAT.coM, http://www.missile
threat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.85/missile-detail.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
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Of course, one cannot create such an automatic trigger while as-
suring that the weapons will never be launched just because the risk is
left in the hands of the potential target. As illustrated in the cult clas-
sic Dr. Strangelove,20 5 one can never really be sure that an automatic
trigger will not be accidentally launched. Additionally, there is always
the potential that the target will fail to act in predictable ways. But, to
the extent possible, when making a commitment, we want to minimize
the chances of an accidental launch by laying a tripwire "that is plainly
visible, that cannot be stumbled on, and that is manifestly connected
to the machinery of war. 20 6
This sort of strategy relies on deterrence. According to Schelling,
Deterrence involves setting the stage-by announcement, by
rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation-and
waiting....
Deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing. "If you
cross the line we shoot in self-defense, or the mines ex-
plode." When? Whenever you cross the line-preferably
never, but the timing is up to you. If you cross it, then is
when the threat is fulfilled, either automatically, if we've
rigged it so, or by obligation that immediately becomes due.
But we can wait-preferably forever; that's our purpose.20 7
It is not unusual to see regulatory nukes packaged as deterrent
tripwires, which requires drawing a clear line in the sand. This relates
directly to the clarity and discretion of the commands found in stat-
utes and rules. Of course, a clear statute provides a more defined line
in the sand because the agency cannot renegotiate its position and
withstand legal scrutiny-at least not without the help of a judge will-
ing to accept a creative reading of the statute. Regulatorily speaking,
this is the Thirty-Eighth Parallel.
For example, when the IRS gives an entity tax-exempt status, it
also obligates the entity to comply with a set of regulatory require-
ments.208 Congress's rules are much clearer in some instances than in
others. On the one hand, the absolute prohibition against endorsing
candidates for public office is a clear line and a nice tripwire.209 On
the other hand, the prohibition against a nonprofit devoting a "sub-
stantial part of the activities" to influencing legislation is less effective
205 DR. STRANGELOVE (Columbia Pictures 1964).
206 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 99.
207 Id. at 71-72.
208 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-i (2011).
209 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(2006).
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as a tripwire.21 ° It is interesting, but perhaps not surprising given
Schelling's scholarship, that Congress received many questions about
what it meant by a "substantial part of the activities" and later passed
a safe harbor that provides nonprofit organizations a more defined
standard that relies on precise dollar values and defined percentages
of an organization's operating funds.211 When a tripwire is set, it is not
surprising that potential targets want to know its precise location.
2. Surrendering Control by "Compellent" Threats
Sometimes threats do not simply require a potential target to re-
strain from crossing a line in the sand, but rather require the target to
get out of the way to avoid harm. Schelling calls this use of threats
compellence. According to Schelling, compellence usually involves in-
itiating an action or threat that is credible, but that may cease or be-
come harmless if the opponent responds.212
A few examples of compellent threats might be helpful. The
story of Moses and Pharaoh is a story of compellent threats: Moses
says time and again in so many words, "Let my people go," or else.213
So, before water turned to blood, before the frogs, the lice, and the
locusts, Moses gave Pharaoh time to release the Israelites from slavery
and thus avoid the threatened harm.214 Compellent threats can also
take the form of something short of all-out war-holding some pain in
reserve. For example, when the United States dropped nuclear bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it not only destroyed those cities but also
threatened the rest of Japan with additional bomb strikes unless it un-
conditionally surrendered. In game theory literature, the game of
chicken, where two parties speed head-on toward each other in cars,
often represents compellent threats. Of course, as difficult as it is to
live with the shame of backing down, that shame is nothing compared
to the harm of a collision. Chicken has many applications. In fact,
Schelling noted in 1966 that chicken
is a universal form of adversary engagement. It is played not
only in the Berlin air corridor but by Negroes who want to
get their children into schools and by whites who want to
keep them out; by rivals at a meeting who both raise their
210 See id.
211 See id. § 501(h).
212 SCHELLINC, supra note 44, at 72.
213 See, e.g., Exodus 7:16, 8:1, :20-21.
214 See id.
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voices, each hoping the other will yield the floor to avoid
embarrassment .... 215
Although the winner of a game of chicken is often determined by
nerves and the extent to which a party is risk averse, a party can get a
tactical advantage by relying on a credible commitment. The key to
using credible commitments in the context of chicken is to credibly
surrender control of one's own fate. 216
Sometimes regulatory nukes come packaged by Congress as com-
pellent threats. For example, regulatory nukes that include punish-
ment on a particular date unless a regulatory target has complied with
the law fit this mold. We see this in the instances where Congress has
instructed the Department of Transportation to hold back highway
funds in the event that a state does not change its drinking law, re-
quire motorcycle helmets, or change its speed limit.217 The same is
true of the REAL ID Act, which requires states to meet a national
identification standard within a particular time period if the state
wants the Transportation Security Administration to recognize the
state's driver's license as an adequate form of identification. 218 In all
of these examples, there is little ambiguity about what a regulatory
target must do in order to avoid the regulatory nuke. The only ques-
tion that remains is whether either the federal government or the state
will flinch, or whether a collision will occur.
B. Leveraging Uncertainty and the Role of Brinkmanship
When it is difficult to make something like the possibility of
launching a regulatory nuke believable, threatening to increase the
likelihood of a launch may prove more credible than just threatening
to launch. As Dixit and Nalebuff put it, "[a]lthough the threat of cer-
tainty of war is not credible, one of a risk or probability of war can be
credible. ' 219 Uncertainty has the potential to make the unthinkable
believable. 220
Leveraging uncertainty in the military context is called
brinksmanship. According to Schelling, brinkmanship is "the deliber-
ate creation of a recognizable risk[,] ... a risk that one does not com-
215 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 116.
216 See DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175 at 144-45.
217 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006); supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
218 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006).
219 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175, at 209.
220 Id. at 208-10.
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pletely control. '221 The purpose of brinkmanship is to "manipulat[e]
the risk of a mutually bad outcome" in hopes of facilitating conces-
sions and compromise.2 22 To the extent brinksmanship works, it alters
a potential target's expectations.223
The brink is not . . . the sharp edge of a cliff where one can
stand firmly, look down, and decide whether or not to
plunge. The brink is a curved slope that one can stand on
with some risk of slipping, the slope gets steeper and the risk
of slipping greater as one moves toward the chasm. But the
slope and the risk of slipping are rather irregular; neither the
person standing there nor onlookers can be quite sure just
how great the risk is, or how much it increases when one take
a few more steps downward. 224
The risks created by regulatory nukes often are uncertain. Even
where an enactment or a rule provides definite timelines, there is the
possibility that Congress or an agency will revisit the issue before the
regulatory nuke is launched. For example, Congress and the execu-
tive branch have already extended the deadline associated with the
REAL ID Act three times. 225 Additionally, vague rules and statutes
allow agencies to play with risk. The No Child Left Behind Act,
which in theory contains the punch to shut down public schools and
districts, leaves the actual decisions to a range of administrators-and
the Obama Administration has announced it will let states opt out of
the law's requirements if they adopt other reforms.226 Although the
FCC has the power to shut down television and radio stations, the use
of this regulatory nuke comes down to how the agency carries out its
very vague mandate to serve the "public interest." When an agency is
given broad standards rather than clear rules, it requires our best
guesswork to determine whether an agency's action is a bluff or a true
threat to escalate the conflict to the next level. Like nuclear
brinksmanship, this leaves open a number of risks related to many of
the concerns Schelling raises: "random or haphazard processes ...
221 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 200.
222 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 175, at 206.
223 Id. at 207.
224 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 199.
225 Mike M. Ahlers, Obama Administration Delays Rule to Improve Driver's License Secur-
ity, CNNPOLITICS (Mar. 4, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-04/politics/real.id-_llicense-
security-license-holders-real-id-act?_s=PM:POLITICS.
226 Greg Toppo, No Child Left Behind Waiver Comes With a Hitch, USA TODAY, Sept. 27,
2011, at 2A.
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faulty information, faulty communication, misunderstanding, misuse
of authority, panic, or human ... failure. ' 227
Uncertainty plays an important role in an agency's threat to
launch regulatory nukes. Although many game theorists begin with
the assumption that both sides have perfect information on the
payoffs of their opponent's response, uncertainty plays a much more
important role when it comes to the reality of regulatory nukes. Ab-
sent uncertainty, we would expect agencies never to launch their regu-
latory nukes unless the regulatory target was not rational or had an
unusual set of preferences. We would also expect to see targets play
right up to the line. Most of the time, what we see is much more
nuanced.
C. Giving Control to a Committed Third Party
Third parties can play a valuable role in making threats credible.
Delegating decisionmaking power can increase credibility for a num-
ber of reasons. One is that it introduces some randomness into the
equation.22 8 A second is that the person charged with a decision has
"an incentive structure of his own that differs from his principal's. ' 229
Schelling provides a number of examples of how delegation plays an
important role in making credible commitments, including the use of
thugs to collect debts and providing nuclear weapons to countries that
are thought to be "less irresolute than the United States. 230
Agencies can also delegate some of their decisionmaking power.
An agency is, in actuality, a "they" and not an "it," and an agency
might therefore vest the power to launch a regulatory nuke with
lower-level bureaucrats. An agency may rely on particular experts to
make some of its decisions, and retain the discretion to decide which
experts to trust.231 Additionally, regulatory nukes that are launched
by those at the helm are often in the hands of political appointees who
change from one administration to the next.
Interest groups often assert pressure or have influence on agen-
cies, which complicates matters. 32 Those outside the agency that have
227 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 201.
228 Id. at 202.
229 Id. at 29.
230 Id. at 142.
231 See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT
GOVERN? 267, 271-73 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
232 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 915, 934 (2005) ("[N]o one doubts that interest groups and other external constituencies
exert considerable influence over agencies.").
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power within may play an important role in the calculus of whether to
make threats and to what extent those threats should be believed. In-
terest groups may also have the ability to force an agency to launch its
regulatory nukes through citizen suits.233 Schelling's scholarship sug-
gests the ability of a third party to access an agency's weapon may be
crucial to making credible threats:
If you are faced with an enemy who thinks you would turn
and run if he kept advancing, and if the bridge is there to run
across, he may keep advancing. . . . But if you burn the
bridge so that you cannot retreat, .... he has a new calcula-
tion to make. He cannot count on what you would prefer to
do if he were advancing irresistibly; he must decide instead
what he ought to do if you were incapable of anything but
resisting him.234
A nondiscretionary duty to launch a regulatory nuke accompa-
nied with a citizen suit provision (something that is common in envi-
ronmental law, for example235) can take the politically preferable
options off the table.
D. Staking Honor and Reputation
Most often, the art of "maneuvering into a position where one
clearly cannot yield" 236 requires more than words. However, some-
times words are all that all we have. In such cases, one option that
Schelling explored in the context of nuclear weapons was "to incur a
political involvement, to get a nation's honor, obligation, and diplo-
matic reputation committed to a response. ' 237 To do this, we might
see leaders attempting to "create a bargaining position [with] public
statements . . . calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no
concessions to be made."238 For example, President Kennedy, who
Thomas Schelling advised, provided an example that helps illustrate
the point. During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy established a firm
line against Russian nuclear expansion into the Western Hemisphere:
"[T]his secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist mis-
233 James E. Pfander, Triangulating Standing, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 829, 838-39 (2009)
("[T]he decision of Congress to include citizen suit provisions in the statute can be seen as a way
of assuring interest groups a place at the regulatory table. Interest groups can sound the alarm,
and invite more pointed congressional oversight, if regulations grow too lax.").
234 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 43.
235 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006).
236 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 44.
237 Id. at 49.
238 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 28.
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siles ...is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the
status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage
and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or
foe. ' 239 With these words, Kennedy staked his reputation and that of
the country on his dedication to the promise. Tying these reputations
to his words made his words all the more credible.
Schelling puts great stock in this strategy of commitment to
change the calculus of the country's future actions:
It is often argued that "face" is a frivolous asset to preserve,
and that it is a sign of immaturity that a government can't
swallow its pride and lose face.... But there is also the more
serious kind of "face," the kind that in modern jargon is
known as a country's "image," consisting of other countries'
beliefs.., about how the country can be expected to behave.
It relates not to a country's "worth" or "status" or even
"honor," but to its reputation for action. If the question is
raised whether this kind of "face" is worth fighting over, the
answer is that this kind of face is one of the few things worth
fighting over.2 40
Likewise, when an agency makes a threat, it may choose to do so
either in a private or public manner. For example, when an agency
makes a threat in a news release, it likely has more skin in the game
when it comes to making good on that threat. When an agency adds
to this a rationale that justifies its actions, the agency may find it diffi-
cult to backtrack.
E. Interdependence
A major reason staking reputation has power is because a solid
reputation is necessary going forward, not just in the present instance.
As Schelling explained, "The main reason why we are committed in
many of these places is that our threats are interdependent. Essen-
tially we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, if we did
not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react
there."241
However, more than reputation is on the line when it comes to
interdependence. A repeat player adds credibility to a threat if it "can
persuasively point to an array of other negotiations in which its own
239 John F. Kennedy, The Soviet Threat to the Americas (Oct. 22, 1962), in 47 DEP'T ST.
BULL., 715.
240 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 124.
241 Id. at 55.
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position would be prejudiced if it made a concession in this one. '242
Through this lens, "what is in dispute is usually not the issue of the
moment, but everyone's expectations about how a participant will be-
have in the future. '243
Similarly, a threat to launch a regulatory nuke is more likely to be
seen as credible if it can be tied to programmatic concerns or concerns
over setting an unpleasant precedent more broadly. For example, one
reason it is difficult for the FCC to make credible threats with regard
to the content of television and radio programing is that historically it
has been unwilling to do So.244 With each successive turning of the
blind eye, the agency has made the threat to launch its regulatory
nuke that much more difficult to leverage. It also becomes that much
more difficult to believe. On the other hand, because the military had
pushed against any exclusion of military recruiters and was not willing
to back down, those that crossed the military and denied its recruiters
access came to expect the loss of federal funding. 245
F. Willingness to Take Intermediate Steps
When wielding a regulatory nuke, it is often difficult to make
words alone believable. However, there often is a broad range of op-
tions between going nuclear and doing nothing at all. As Schelling
points out, "Between the threats of massive retaliation and of limited
war there is the possibility of less-than-massive retaliation, of gradu-
ated reprisal. '246 When there is a range of options, Shelling suggests
that one look for a way to break down a threat "into a series of con-
secutive smaller threats," and use these smaller steps "to demonstrate
on the first few transgressions that the threat will be carried out on the
rest. ' 247 In noteworthy scholarship along this vein in the administra-
tive context, Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have high-
lighted how the willingness to take intermediate steps can obviate the
need to use more serious regulatory weapons.2 48 They argue that will-
ingness to take small steps up what they referred to as the "enforce-
ment pyramid" 249 generally indicates willingness to take the next step
242 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 30.
243 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 118.
244 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
246 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 194.
247 Id. at 41.
248 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-41 (1992).
249 Id. at 35.
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and thereby make it unnecessary to rely on what they refer to as "the
benign big gun. 12 50
Because of this, Congress puts an agency at a real disadvantage in
securing regulatory compliance when it provides a nuclear option, but
very little else, in the agency's arsenal. This is the reason, for example,
that the IRS has trouble leveraging its ability to revoke a nonprofit
organization's tax-exempt status: it has the option to do nothing or to
revoke, but in large part, between those extremes, the IRS's hands are
tied. By taking steps smaller than launching a regulatory nuke along
the path of enforcement, an agency is able to show that it means busi-
ness even when it comes to regulatory nukes.
This Part has discussed ways to make threats credible. Making
threats credible, even when an agency wants to, is often difficult and
sometimes impossible. And even when an agency attempts to make
its threat credible, there is no guarantee that the potential target will
get the message and respond to the threat as the agency hopes. The
next Part turns to the decision facing the potential target: whether or
not to comply.
V. COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE
Many stories surrounding nuclear bombs provide insight into the
topic of compliance and defiance. These stories include the dramatic
moment of Japan surrendering in order to avoid further nuclear de-
struction, the tense episodes in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
drama of the Russian ships turning back, and the persistence of Kim
Jong II to continue North Korea's nuclear program despite the pres-
sure he faced from the international community.
In thinking about whether to comply with or defy a regulatory
threat, or whether to risk crossing an agency in the event that a threat
has not been made, a potential regulatory target has to take into ac-
count a number of factors. The following Sections introduce the ma-
jor factors that come into play. These include the cost of compliance,
the perception of risk, and the costs associated with regulatory nukes.
After discussing these factors, the Section highlights the importance of
considering the rate of compliance when thinking about the impact of
regulatory nukes. Because compliance is generally less interesting
than other ends to the regulatory nuke game, it is often overlooked.
250 Id. at 40. Some readers have asked me the difference between a regulatory nuke and
the benign big gun. The major distinction is that a regulatory nuke is politically taboo. The
examples Ayres and Braithwaite give, although significant, do not pose problems related to cred-
ibility when an agency threatens to use them.
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Although focusing on compliance may sometimes seem boring, failing
to focus on the rate of compliance often causes us to gloss over the big
picture. The compliance and defiance decision nodes are highlighted
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Regulatory Nuke Game-Compliance and Defiance
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A. Factors that Targets Consider
1. Compliance Costs
One factor a target might consider is the cost of compliance.
Those who have seen the movie Austin Powers: International Man of
Mystery251 (and admit to the fact) will certainly remember the scene
where Dr. Evil appears via television to various world leaders. He
informs them that he has in his possession nuclear missiles, stolen
from the fictional country of Kreplachistan.2 2 He attempts to black-
mail the word leaders: "If you want it back, you'll have to pay me ...
one million dollars! ' '253 At this meager blackmail ransom, the world
leaders act confused. Once he realizes that he has confused the ran-
som amount, he says, "Sorry. One-hundred billion dollars! ''254 The
leaders get a much more solemn look about them. Then, one of the
world leaders explains that it is the policy of the United Nations not to
negotiate with terrorists.25s
251 AUSTIN POWERS: INTERNATIONAL MAN OF MYSTERY (New Line 1997).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
20121
488 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
This silly example provides a helpful starting point for discussing
two major categories of compliance costs. The first category is effort
costs, which include the costs (both monetary and otherwise) that are
necessary to comply with the threat. In this example, the effort costs
increase dramatically once Dr. Evil realizes that he gave the wrong
ransom cost-from one million to one-hundred billion dollars.
The second category is political costs, which encapsulate the neg-
ative consequences of complying with a threat. In the Dr. Evil exam-
ple, the political costs are those associated with negotiating with a
terrorist. Though the leaders do not specifically state what political
costs are associated with negotiating with a terrorist, they might in-
clude the costs of a bad precedent and the costs associated with gain-
ing a reputation for caving in to a terrorist's threats.
Within the realm of regulatory nukes, the amount of effort re-
quired to comply with an agency's threat can vary widely. Take the
mandate found in the Clean Air Act that requires automobile manu-
facturers to create something akin to the catalytic converter.25 6 When
Congress imposed that obligation, whether the automotive industry
could create such a device in a way that would prove commercially
viable was a bit of guesswork.2 5 7 Such an invention seemed to loom
on the horizon, and prototypes had been made, but its success was not
assured .2 5  Compare the invention of speculative technologies by the
auto industry with that of the effort of Yale Law School backing down
and allowing military recruiters on campus, which would perhaps en-
tail scheduling a room or setting up a table, or efforts associated with
a nonprofit organization not endorsing a political candidate, which
probably would not require changing the status quo.
The current debate over Iran's nuclear program serves as a nice
illustration of a third category of costs: the political costs of compli-
ance. President Ahmadinejad's menacing political reputation in Iran,
the Middle East, and the world is in large part the result of his not
backing down against the intense foreign pressure to forgo pursuing a
nuclear program.259 Even though Iran will certainly spend money pur-
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(1) (2006).
257 See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science
Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 273, 277-78 (2005).
258 See id.
259 See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Michael Slackman, U.S. Is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for
Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at Al ("The earlier agreement fell apart under political
pressure in Iran when nearly every political faction criticized it as compromising Iran's right to
nuclear energy.").
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suing a nuclear program, from Ahmadinejad's perspective, the cost of
not pursuing such a program is political disaster.260
Similarly, in the context of regulatory nukes, political costs are
often important considerations. The reason Yale Law School had
such a difficult time allowing military recruiters on campus is that it
had a longstanding opposition to the military's policy of excluding
gays and lesbians. 61 Complying with the military's demands forced
Yale Law School to compromise its position.262 Before the federal
government stepped in to force desegregation of schools in the South,
local political pressure compelled southern states to maintain the sta-
tus quo for as long as possible even though doing so was otherwise
costly. 263 This pressure is apparent beyond the desegregation issue in
the South; we have seen tensions flare up when the federal govern-
ment steps into a role traditionally left to states, including decisions to
attempt to control land use patterns under the Clean Air Act, 264 edu-
cational standards for state-run public schools, 265 laws relating to
speed limits on highways, 266 motorcycle helmet laws,267 the legal drink-
ing age,268 and the format and content of driver's licenses.269 Political
costs may also come into play when a regulatory target is a repeat
player with an agency. When faced with a regulatory threat, the target
has to worry about whether its actions would set a problematic prece-
dent and weaken the target in other strategic interactions.
260 See id.
261 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
263 See Branton, supra note 139, at 258.
264 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006); see also, e.g., Jacalyn R. Fleming, Comment, The Scope of Fed-
eral Authority Under the Endangered Species Act: Implications for Local Land Use Planning, 65
ALB. L. REV. 497, 497 (2001) (discussing the Federal Government taking land use controls from
the States under environmental acts, including the Clean Air Act).
265 See, e.g., Rentschler, supra note 123, at 640-53 (discussing in depth the shift of power
over education from state to federal government); Greenberger, supra note 123, at 1016 (exam-
ining the impact of the tension between state and federal government on enforcement by the
Department of Education).
266 See, e.g., Tom Christoffel, Traffic Safety in the Electronic Age: Radar Detectors vs. Speed
Law Enforcement, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1989) (discussing the vigorous debate about
whether speed limits should be left to state or federal government).
267 See id. at 8 (discussing federal use of the spending power to influence the states' police
power to mandate the use of motorcycle helmets).
268 See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
269 See, e.g., H.B. 287, 60th Leg., Spec. Sess., 2007 Mont. Laws 916, 917 ("WHEREAS, the
mandate to the states, through federal legislation that provides no funding for its requirements,
to issue what is, in effect, a national identification card appears to be an attempt to 'comman-
deer' the political machinery of the states and to require them to be agents of the federal govern-
ment, in violation of the principles of federalism.").
2012]
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
2. Risk of an Agency Launching a Regulatory Nuke
A second factor a target may consider is the perceived risk of an
agency launching its regulatory nuke. The perceived seriousness of
the threat is a function of the potential damage caused by a launch of
a regulatory nuke and the probability that the agency will launch it.
The greater the harm caused by the nuke and the more credible the
threat, the more a regulatory target should worry.
This is a complicated analysis for a number of reasons. Consider
that different targets might weigh the same risks differently. The an-
swer to "why do agencies go nuclear?" in many cases might be found
in the characteristics of the potential target rather than in the charac-
teristics of the agency. It could be an unusual regulatory target that
presses the agency to prove its threat rather than an unusual agency
that launches its regulatory nuke. Consider, for example, the arche-
typal story of standing up to what seemed to be assured destruction:
the story of David and Goliath.27 0 The fact that David fought the well-
armored giant says a lot more about David than it does about
Goliath.271
There are many factors that determine why different targets per-
ceive similar risks differently. It might have to do with the informa-
tion the target has available to it. For example, if one is well aware of
the fact that an agency hardly ever resorts to a regulatory nuke,
threats to launch it might be more difficult to communicate with credi-
bility. It might have to do with how the threat was delivered. And,
because the psychology of risk analysis is so personal, "once delivered,
it is often difficult to predict how others will react-whether the threat
will be heeded. 272
Moreover, people are generally very poor at considering high-
stakes risks with low probabilities. The field of cognitive psychology
has established that people have bimodal response to catastrophic
risk.273 This line of research suggests that people pay much more at-
tention to particular risks than the risks rationally deserve and also fail
270 1 Samuel 17:1-:51.
271 Had Goliath smashed David, the story would read very differently. I imagine that
David would have ended up as an archetype of delusion. Thankfully, David prevailed and the
archetype of delusion is safely in the hands of the modern Chicago Cubs fan.
272 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 28.
273 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979); see also, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Cognitive Biases,
Cognitive Limits, and Risk Communication, 23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 7, 9 (2004); Reid Hastie
& W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 901, 910 (1998).
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to take some catastrophic risks seriously enough.274 So it may be that
many regulatory targets fail to adequately consider the risk a regula-
tory nuke poses because people are just bad at sizing up that sort of
risk.
3. Harm Associated with a Regulatory Nuke
A third factor that a target might consider is the harm associated
with an agency going nuclear. Although we tend to think about get-
ting nuked as complete annihilation, the harm felt is somewhat con-
textual. When a potential target does not care (or care very much)
about getting hit by a regulatory nuke, the threat to nuke is not nearly
as dire to that target as we might believe. Take the example of Yale
Law School and the decision it was required to make to lift its ban of
military recruiters or to risk the larger university losing all sources of
federal funding. 2 5 Again, while Yale Law School did not receive
much in the way of federal funding, Yale University's science, engi-
neering, and medical programs substantially depended on it and a loss
of funding would hurt the well-being of the larger campus. 276 By con-
trast, Vermont Law School and William Mitchell College of Law had
likewise barred military recruiters from campus, and the Department
of Defense threatened to revoke funding from the law schools.277 Un-
like Yale Law School, however, these schools are not associated with
larger universities that rely heavily on federal funding. 78 Although
there is no doubt that the decision to keep out recruiters came at
somewhat of a cost, the cost is nowhere near the devastating blow that
would have been dealt to schools like Yale. Both Vermont and
William Mitchell had their funds revoked, yet still held firm
nevertheless. 279
274 See Catherine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1519 (1998).
275 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 169 (D. Conn. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Burt v.
Gates, 502 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007).
276 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
277 See Katrina M. Gallo, Casenote, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc., 33 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 715, 726 (2007) (discussing schools facing sanctions as a result
of denying military recruiters access to campus).
278 See Lindsay Gayle Stevenson, Military Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orienta-
tion: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1331, 1357-58
(2004) (discussing the abilities of schools that received little federal funding to maintain anti-
discrimination policies).
279 See Gallo, supra note 277, at 726 ("According to Geoffrey Shields, dean of Vermont
Law School, 'We've stuck to our guns, and I anticipate we'll continue to stick to our guns."').
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Additionally, although the threat from the IRS to revoke an or-
ganization's nonprofit status can be an extreme remedy because it is
so painful to entities that currently seek or plan to seek contributions
on the promise of a tax write-off, the threat is not nearly as dire to a
nonprofit organization that does not care about its ability to offer do-
nors a tax deduction.
B. Untold Story of Compliance
Because the threat of regulatory nukes translates into the possi-
bility of the regulatory target suffering major damage, it is easy to
gloss over the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, regulatory targets
comply when faced with the threat of a regulatory nuke. Further-
more, compliance is often won the easy way: without the agency even
having to make a threat to the individual target. The prospect that the
threat and launch is in the offing is deterrent enough.
Consider a regulatory nuke that is quite familiar to the average
American-the prospect of prison time for tax evasion. In 2009, the
IRS received nearly 140 million tax returns and only recommended
that the Justice Department prosecute 1269 for tax or tax-related
crimes.2 0 This represents fewer than 1 recommendation for every
100,000 returns submitted. Additionally, it seems unlikely that the
Justice Department would pursue each recommended case. Interest-
ingly, the IRS only examined approximately one percent of the re-
turns filed in detail. 281 The IRS does not need to use direct threats to
convince most Americans that paying federal taxes is necessary. 28 2
Although the story of the citizen who failed to pay taxes and ended up
in prison might get media coverage and capture the public's attention,
the much more common story of compliance is less exciting. "Citizen
Pays Taxes" is a terrible headline. With mushroom clouds on the hori-
zon in this example and many like it, we overlook the story that de-
fines the vast majority of potential regulatory targets and rather focus
on the story of the exception.
When commentators remark on how infrequently an agency uses
a regulatory nuke, they commonly leave out the line of thinking asso-
ciated with the rate of compliance. In instances of extreme noncom-
pliance, a failure to use a regulatory nuke does make the nuke dead-
280 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2009 ENFORCEMENT RESULTS (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/fy-2009_enforcement-results.pdf.
281 Id.
282 Admittedly, Americans comply with the IRS's demand to pay taxes for a number of
reasons other than fear of prison time.
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letter law. If, however, compliance is high, as it seems to be in the
context of the federal tax system, it may just be a reflection of an
agency's efficiency in leveraging the regulatory nuke. Launching the
regulatory nuke is not the only use of the nuke. As Schelling has
made clear in the nuclear-missile setting, weapons have uses beyond
warfare; they hold potential for "diplomatic use of potential vio-
lence. '283 "The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is
diplomacy-vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. 28 4
Sometimes agencies do leverage the threat of launching regula-
tory nukes to spur compliance. For example, one of the powers that
the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs ("OFCCP") uses to secure compliance with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 197228- is to debar contractors from re-
ceiving federal contracts. 286 Although the Department of Labor has
shown itself willing to threaten debarment, most of the time it does
not need to follow through with its threat.287 It turns out this way
because once a government contractor receives a notice of an OFCCP
review (i.e., the regulatory threat), compliance with the law (and per-
haps overcompliance) is forthcoming. 288
To summarize, compliance should be expected when the cost of
compliance is less than the harm expected from a regulatory nuke and
the probability the harm will occur.2 89 The next Part turns to those
circumstances in which a regulatory target does not comply and how
an agency grapples with the decision of whether to go nuclear.
VI. DETONATION AND HUMILIATION
According to Schelling, countries might end up going to war for a
number of reasons. Two of these are relevant here. First, "war can
occur because both sides become committed to irreconcilable posi-
283 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at ix.
284 Id. at 2.
285 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
286 James P. Sterba, Completing Thomas Sowell's Study of Affirmative Action and Then
Drawing Different Conclusions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 657, 663-64 (2004).
287 See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private
Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits over Time, 31 LAW & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 855, 863 (2006) (finding that there were seventeen debarments between 1977 and 1985).
288 See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from
Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279,286 (2007) ("Debarment is rare, so
the real sanction ... is the compliance review itself.").
289 Others have used similar equations when discussing whether to comply with a nuclear
threat. See, e.g., JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTs 41 (1994).
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tions from which neither is willing to back down." 290 Second, it may
be that in an attempt to make credible commitments, we have "relin-
quished the power to retreat. 2 91 Both of these reasons illustrate a
real cost of credible threats: failure to comply means living with the
results of following through or living with the cost of being proven a
pushover.292 It may be we have destroyed our options and we follow
through because "we just cannot help it" or because due to "some
overwhelming cost of not reacting in the manner we had declared" we
have no practical choice in the matter.2 93 It is in that hour that those
leveraging a regulatory nuke for politics, negotiation, and diplomacy
come to realize what it means to "surrender[ ] and destroy[ ] options
that [they] might have been expected to find too attractive in an
emergency. " 294
An agency with a regulatory nuke might find itself without any
options in a number of situations. First, sometimes agencies tie their
hands with rules or prior positions.295 An agency that has committed
to an interpretation of law or a program might not be able to turn
away without being found arbitrary and capricious. 296 Second, an
agency might have its hands tied by Congress's clear language and a
court willing to enforce that language. 297 In such cases, noncompli-
ance may leave an agency no legally permissible choice but to launch
its regulatory nukes.2 98 Third, an agency that has bound up adminis-
trative prestige might not be able to alter its course due to political
reasons.2 99 Certainly, "if the commitment is ill defined and ambigu-
ous-if we leave ourselves loopholes through which to exit-our op-
ponent will expect us to be under strong temptation to make a
graceful exit (or even a somewhat graceless one) and he may be
right. '300 We would not expect an exit door to be used, however, if the
costs of backing down outweigh the costs of launching the regulatory
nukes. All of this goes back to how much flesh an agency puts into the
game in trying to make its threats credible. 301
290 SCHELLING, supra note 178, at 201.
291 Id. at 37.
292 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 43.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 44.
295 See supra Part IV.A.1.
296 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
297 See supra Part IV.A.2.
298 See supra Part IV.A.2.
299 See supra Part IV.D.
300 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 48.
301 See supra Part IV.D-E.
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If an agency finds itself in this position, it is faced with two un-
pleasant options, as shown in Figure 5. The first is launching the regu-
latory nuke and dealing with the attendant controversy. 3 2 The second
is showing the world that it does not have the nerve to pull the trigger
and living with the fact that it showed itself to be a pushover. 30 3 To
put this into context, however, consider several examples of each op-
tion and result.
Figure 5. Regulatory Nuke Game-Launch
t T a rg e t I T a rge t
Complies Agency Retaliates
Agency Launches
Makes Threat Tn- pl. Nuke
Agency Given gec Agency
Regulatory Backs Down
Nuke
Agency Complies Agency Retaliates~Launches
Does Not NukeMake Threat Target Risks No
Crossing Retaliation
Agency Agency
Ignores
Violation
A. Going Nuclear
Just as Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now associated with the nu-
clear bomb, an agency's launch of a regulatory nuke quickly domi-
nates the history of that regulatory tool. The fact that the weapon is
defined by its launches is characteristic of regulatory nukes too. It is
the lost highway funds and the organizations that are no longer con-
sidered nonprofits that define the tool.304
Most of the time, a regulatory nuke is launched only after an
agency threat or a series of threats. Consider, for example, one of the
most memorable standoffs in environmental law: EPA's efforts to lev-
erage threats found in the Clean Air Act to push Los Angeles to
tackle its air pollution problem in the 1970s. In 1972, the greater Los
Angeles area submitted to EPA a plan showing how it would come
into compliance with the Act's ambient air quality standards for car-
302 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 43.
303 Id.
304 See supra Part II.
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bon monoxide and ozone pollutants, as required by law. 30 5 At the
time, the common perception among the line-level bureaucrats at
EPA and among those who created the plan was that EPA would have
no political choice but to approve the plan because Southern Califor-
nia's compliance with the Act seemed virtually impossible. 30 6 How-
ever, EPA's first Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, refused to
approve the plan because it did not bring Los Angeles into conformity
with the Act's standards before the statutory deadline of 1975.307 EPA
gave Southern California six months to come up with a plan that con-
formed to the Act.308 Ruckelshaus explained that if the region failed,
EPA would have to come up with its own federal implementation
plan.300 With this, EPA had made its threat.
The greater Los Angeles area did not come up with a plan and
EPA sat on its hands for six months, and then a number of cities, orga-
nizations, and individuals adversely impacted by Los Angeles's dirty
air sued EPA for failing to comply with the Clean Air Act. 310 A fed-
eral district court agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered EPA to create
a federal plan.311 EPA complied with the court's order and launched
its regulatory nuke. The federal implementation plan included,
among other things, a gas rationing provision that (but for a political
firestorm and intervention by Congress) could have reduced Los An-
geles's gas consumption by eighty-two percent by 1977.312
Other examples already mentioned of agencies going nuclear af-
ter notice include the military taking away federal funding from the
University of Vermont and William Mitchell School of Law,313 EPA
pulling the trigger on advanced pollution controls, 314 and the Depart-
ment of Transportation taking away federal highway funding for states
305 John Dreyfuss, State, U.S. Agree on Clean Air Plan: It Won't Work, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1972, at B1.
306 Id.
307 Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 10,852 (May
31, 1972) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52 (2011)).
308 Id. at 10,854-55.
309 Id. at 10,842.
310 See City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1728, 1729 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
311 Id. at 1731.
312 See California Air Quality Standards, 38 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2195 (Jan. 22, 1973); Woods,
supra note 115, at 1284-85.
313 See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
314 See discussion supra Part V.A.1.
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that bucked the federal government'and refused to adjust the legal
age to drink alcohol. 315
In some unusual cases, agencies go nuclear without giving much
notice. In many ways, these instances represent both a missed oppor-
tunity to secure compliance and, more often than not, the inability to
make a threat due to constraints placed on the agency. An example of
the inability of an agency to make threats is found in the federal gov-
ernment taking over major financial institutions during the economic
meltdown of 2008.316 The federal government could not give the fail-
ing banks much notice or make detailed threats because it was wor-
ried about creating further instability in the markets or that its actions
would induce shareholders to dump their stocks. 317 Other examples of
surprise attacks include raids of employers suspected of employing il-
legal immigrants or the Justice Department bringing criminal charges
against a corporation like Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice.
Although the federal government generally does not launch these reg-
ulatory nukes, advance warning creates a risk that the business would
remove the illegal immigrants or that a company would destroy evi-
dence of its obstruction.
B. Keeping Quiet and Backing Down
To the extent that an agency threatens to launch its regulatory
nuke in the face of noncompliance but does not, it is certain that it
would have been much better for the agency to have never threatened
to launch it. In the absence of a threat, the regulatory nuke is an
underutilized tool-maybe a sleeping dragon, and perhaps a dud. In
the face of a threat, it is not the tool that warrants our attention,
rather it is the agency. The agency has shown weakness, and, to its
detriment, proved itself unable to pull the trigger.318
315 See discussion supra Part II.E.
316 See generally The Condition of Financial Institutions: Examining the Failure and Seizure
of an American Bank: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer Credit of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010).
317 See, e.g., BAIRD WEBEL & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34730,
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: LEGISLATION AND TREASURY IMPLEMENTATION 18-19,
25-26 (2009). This does not mean that the banks were caught totally unaware of the possibility
of a federal takeover. Although there were no formal agency actions, the companies were well
aware of their inability to raise capital and that a federal takeover was one of the consequences
that might follow. See Hill, supra note 17, at 52-55.
318 As discussed below, one could view the use of regulatory nukes as a game of chicken.
"[W]ith chicken it takes two not to play. If you are publicly invited to play chicken and say you
would rather not, you have just played." SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 118. When a potential
target challenges an agency to use its regulatory nuke, the agency cannot avoid playing chicken.
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For example, two agencies have suffered in recent years due to
their inability to launch regulatory nukes. The first is the IRS. As
mentioned earlier, one of the regulatory nukes the IRS possesses is
the ability to strip a charitable organization of its nonprofit status in
the event that the organization endorses a political candidate. 319 The
IRS's inability to follow through with threats has emboldened
churches to challenge the IRS by publicly endorsing candidates in
what the churches deemed "Pulpit Freedom Sunday" and then send-
ing copies of their sermons endorsing candidates to the IRS.320 As of
yet, the IRS has not responded to these provocations, which only
highlights the IRS's unwillingness to enforce all the more. 321
Also mentioned earlier is the FCC's power to revoke licenses of
commercial broadcasters. 322 Although the FCC has threatened revo-
cation, it has never actually pulled the trigger.3 23 Perhaps because of
this, many television and radio shows have come to rely on the FCC's
reputation of weakness as a fairly routine comedy ploy. For example,
a South Park episode mocking the FCC's decency standards included
the word "shit" 162 times.324 Rather than receiving respect because of
its regulatory nuke, due to its inability to pull the trigger, the FCC's
weakness has become a punch line, and the agency itself a punching
bag.
Because so much rides on whether an agency can obtain compli-
ance from its targets, as discussed earlier, the art of making credible
threats is vital to an agency's attempt to leverage a regulatory nuke. 325
Although credibility is the agency's currency in this game, sometimes
The loss is more pronounced when the agency draws attention to itself by making threats, only to
back down later.
319 See supra Part II.B.
320 Strom, supra note 73.
321 See id.
322 See supra Part II.C.
323 See Klopp, supra note 79, at 310 ("Although the FCC has never fully exercised its statu-
tory enforcement powers, it has repeatedly warned broadcasters of its willingness to revoke a
broadcaster's license for indecent broadcasts."); see also Michael Cohen, Have You No Sense of
Decency? An Examination of the Effect of Traditional Values and Family-Oriented Organizations
on Twenty-First Century Broadcast Indecency Standards, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 113, 134
(2005) ("The law also allows the FCC to revoke the license of any station that violates its regula-
tions; however, the Commission has never exercised this power for an indecency violation.").
324 Sallie Hofmeister, Indecency Proposal Getting Static from Cable, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 5,
2005, at C1 (noting that South Park was among shows on cable networks, which are exempt from
FCC broadcast regulations, that "dramatiz[e] the very things that federal regulations prohibit on
broadcast television").
325 See supra Part IV.
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regulated targets have the ability to retaliate. The next Part addresses
this possibility.
VII. RETALIATION
Within the realm of actual nuclear arms, the threat of retaliation
is often credited as the reason why the weapons have not been
launched.326 This is the gist of mutually assured destruction
("MAD"). Critical to modern-day nuclear strategy is the likelihood
that launching a nuclear warhead will result in a counterattack in kind.
The songwriter Sting captured the thrust of why MAD can be credited
with keeping peace:
Mister Khrushchev said, "We will bury you"
I don't subscribe to this point of view
It'd be such an ignorant thing to do
If the Russians love their children too .... 327
Along these lines, an important take-home message of Schelling's
early work was that an optimal military strategy would emphasize
both the power to hurt and the commitment not to launch the weap-
ons unless an opponent launches one first: "It is the power to hurt, not
military strength in the traditional sense, that inheres in our most im-
pressive military capabilities at the present time. We have a Depart-
ment of Defense but emphasize retaliation[] ... 328
Although retaliation has a role in the world of regulatory nukes,
it is not the symmetrical role that we see in the world of actual nuclear
weapons. For regulatory nukes, we do not find mutual and identical
threats. However, in some instances a regulated entity has its own
sort of recourse to retaliation. The subsequent Sections highlight
three types of potential retaliation, and the retaliation decision nodes
are shown in Figure 6.
326 See Blake Klein, "Bad Cop" Diplomacy & Preemption: An Analysis of International
Law and Politics Governing Weapons Proliferation, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 391-92
(2004) (discussing the threat of retaliation as a weapon in the Cold War).
327 STING, Russians, in LYRICS BY STING 104 (2007).
328 SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 7.
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Figure 6. Regulatory Nuke Game-Retaliation
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A. Targets with Their Own Weapons
The first sort of retaliation worth noting is the punishment that
targets themselves can inflict on agencies willing to launch regulatory
nukes. For example, big industries often have the ability to dump mil-
lions of dollars into advertisement campaigns and lobbying efforts de-
signed to punish an agency that crosses them. For an illustration of a
potential retaliation of this sort, consider the Medicine Equity and
Drug Safety Act of 2000.329 The bill purported to give pharmacists
and drug wholesalers the ability to import less costly prescription
drugs from outside of the United States.330 Before this could occur,
however, the Act required the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices ("HHS") to make a finding that drug imports would not pose
additional risks to the public health and would lead to significant sav-
ings for consumers. 33' None of those who have served as Secretary of
the HHS have been willing to make such a finding or seemingly even
seriously considered doing so. 332 There are those who have argued
that this should not be surprising because the structure of the Act pur-
posely made it difficult for the Secretary to pull the trigger.333 Al-
though making cheaper foreign drugs might seem politically popular
329 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2006).
330 DONNA U. VOGT & BLANCHARD RANDALL IV, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20996,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPORTATION FOR PERSONAL USE 1-2 (2001).
331 Id. at 2.
332 David Sirota, We've Seen This Healthcare Trigger Before, SALON.COM (Sept. 12, 2009,
8:12 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinionlfeature/2009/09/12/trigger.
333 Id.
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to the average consumer, the prospect is terrifying to the deep-pock-
eted U.S. drug industry and the prospect of retaliation from the drug
industry apparently terrifies HHS.334 Similar stories could be told with
regard to the banking, tobacco, or automotive industries.
However, not every regulatory nuke targets a gigantic industry.
Politically, some of the tools that regulators exploit to utilize a threat's
value have impacts that are concentrated on a particular business
(rather than industry) or a particular project (rather than policy). In
such cases, there is the possibility that the regulatory target does not
have much power to retaliate politically. For example, the govern-
ment contractors under the thumb of the OFCCP are generally not
national players with vast resources.335 So, when the OFCCP conducts
a review of the contractor's compliance with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, the regulatory target might not have much political
recourse at all. Because of this, it is much less costly for the agency to
make its threats and to follow through. In this vein, it is easy to won-
der if the federal government really would have revoked highway
funds for a state failing to raise the drinking age to twenty-one if the
holdouts had been California, Florida, and New York rather than Wy-
oming, South Dakota, and Louisiana.3 36 Would the Department of
Defense have revoked Yale University's federal funding if Yale Law
School had held out? 337 Would the NCAA really have given the
Death Penalty had USC, Florida, or Notre Dame been in its sights
instead of SMU? 338
B. Third-Party Retaliation
Additionally, agencies might worry about retaliation from those
other than the regulatory target. Even in the context of actual nuclear
armaments, this is not unusual. Remember again Kennedy's threat to
Russia during the Cuban Missile Crisis: "It shall be the policy of this
Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union
on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the
334 Vaishali V. Shah, Prescription Drugs in America: The Pain of Pricing Has an Unpromis-
ing Cure, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 862 n.22.
335 See Sterba, supra note 286, at 664 (noting that only four large corporations had been
debarred during the first three decades of OFCCP enforcement).
336 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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Soviet Union. ' 339 If Russia bombed Guyana, for example, Russia had
to wonder whether the United States would respond in kind.
The world of checks and balances provides avenues for third-
party retaliation. Congress, for example, has many avenues by which
to make life difficult for an agency. The spectrum of options available
to Congress starts with members of Congress advocating in the name
of constituent services and holding a hearing, includes intermediate
sanctions such as disfavoring the agency in budgetary matters, and fi-
nally culminates with congressional nukes in the form of revoking an
agency's power and initiating impeachment proceedings against
agency leaders.
Agencies might also fear retaliation from the courts. Courts
could find that the agency violated the law when using its regulatory
nuke. Very often, when an agency launches a regulatory nuke, a law-
suit will follow, creating a real concern. For example, when EPA did
what many considered the unthinkable and attempted to hold the
auto industry to the statutory deadlines imposed by the Clean Air Act
for improved emissions standards, the agency's action was set aside by
a federal court of appeals. 340 Similarly, the Supreme Court sunk the
FDA's attempt to classify tobacco as a drug by finding that Congress
could not have meant for the agency to take this step, despite the fact
that tobacco seemed to meet the statutory definition of a drug.341 As
for the Executive, if an agency crosses the President, it might mean
agency restructuring, personnel changes, or other consequences of an-
tagonizing the person ultimately charged with administering the
agency. However, rather than employing tools to punish an agency
that goes nuclear, the President, or those heading agencies, more
often take precautions to exercise a degree of control over regulatory
nukes. An illustrative example of this is the history of EPA's ability to
veto dredge-and-fill permits issued by the Corps of Engineers, as dis-
cussed earlier in the Article. 342 Although lower-level bureaucrats
could initially make such decisions, at the end of the 1980s, EPA be-
gan to require that the decision to veto be made much further up the
chain.343 In the event that a line-level bureaucrat wants to veto one of
the Corps's decisions, the decision is elevated up the chain of com-
339 John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet
Arms Buildup in Cuba (Oct. 22, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY: 1962, at 485, 485 (1963).
340 Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34t FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160-61 (2000).
342 See supra Part I.F.
343 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ENVI-
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mand both within the Corps and EPA.344 If negotiations fail on the
way up the chain of command, the final decision on whether EPA will
veto a permit rests with the Administrator of EPA.345
C. Political Fallout
Depending on geography, nuclear fallout may limit the ability of
a country to launch nuclear weapons. Consider the unlikely scenario
of the United States bombing Vancouver, Canada, or Juarez, Mexico.
Doing so would almost certainly mean extensive fallout for Seattle,
Washington, or El Paso, Texas. Perhaps more realistically, this is part
of what keeps Israel from nuking the Palestinians regardless of how
heated the fighting gets between them.
Although regulatory nukes do not result in fallout the same way
actual nuclear weapons do, they do present the risk of political fallout.
In using a regulatory nuke, an agency might worry about the political
influence of interest groups, hostile politicians, skeptical journalists, or
grassroots movements, just to name a few. In many ways, these are
predictable outcomes of using regulatory weapons that have elements
of political taboo associated with them.
Of course, the broader the scope of harm inflicted by a regulatory
nuke, the more likely it is that political fallout is an issue. For exam-
ple, in the 1970s, when EPA attempted to enforce the Clean Air Act
in Los Angeles by mandating gas rationing, EPA faced fierce opposi-
tion from the city. 346 If the Department of Homeland Security de-
cided to pull the trigger on its power under the REAL ID Act,
residents of states failing to comply might suffer the consequences as
they try to enter airports or federal buildings without federally recog-
nized forms of identification. 347 The same is true if the Department of
Transportation or EPA were to confiscate a state's highway funds.348
Sometimes, even when the scope of a regulatory nuke is not
broad, the political fallout of using it can be dramatic-although often
not in ways that are predictable. For example, when the leaders of
New London, Connecticut, decided to use the power of eminent do-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (1992), available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/1992-MOA_4o4q.pdf.
344 See id. at 7-9.
345 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)-(d) (2006).
346 See Patrick Del Duca & Daniel Mansueto, Indirect Source Controls: An Intersection of
Air Quality Management and Land Use Regulation, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1131, 1140-41 (1991)
(discussing the "political uproar" surrounding the EPA decision).
347 See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 104-04 and accompanying text.
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main to evict Susette Kelo and her neighbors in order to facilitate
redevelopment of the city, the city leaders would have had difficulty
anticipating the fallout that would surround their decision. 349 This de-
cision not only made its way to the Supreme Court (something highly
unusual in its own right), but also exploded into political discontent
that ended the careers of many of the officials that oversaw the deci-
sion, and also brought nationwide news coverage and the adoption of
political reforms across the country.350 The symbolic power of that
regulatory nuke has in many ways become synonymous with abusive
use of governmental power.
CONCLUSION
In informal conversation, we often hear people comparing an
agency's power to aspects of war: big guns, arsenals, war chests, weap-
ons, and triggers, just to name a few. When an agency resorts to an
extraordinary means that ordinarily is politically unavailable, we
might say that the agency dropped the bomb, or that it went nuclear.
Analyzed through the lens of game theory, we see that this analogy is
not only apt but also holds untapped insights into agency powers. This
theoretical lens suggests, and real-world examples confirm, that the
way an agency leverages its regulatory nukes is more nuanced than
might be expected. As the Peacekeeper Missile's name implies, suc-
cessful leveraging of nukes, including regulatory nukes, can result in
compliance that negates the need to launch the weapon. Regulatory
nukes often are misunderstood and underestimated by legal scholars
and practitioners. Remedying this misconception is important if we
are to understand the regulatory nuke's true force, and if those inside
and outside of agencies are to understand how the regulatory nuke
game is played. Even in the rare event that an agency goes nuclear,
we should not be so blinded by the light of the explosion that we fail
to see the more important story of threats and compliance that hides
in the shadows.
349 Bruce Ramsey, Commentary, Susette Kelo Lost Her Case-but Started a Movement to
Reform the Law of Eminent Domain, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, http://seattletimes.nw
source.com/html/opinion/2008753858-opinal8ramsey.html; Jerome Tuccille, Susette Kelo's
Revenge: New London Regrets Eminent Domain Fiasco, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 10, 2009)
http://www.examiner.com/civil-liberties-in-national/susette-kelo-s-revenge-new-london-regrets-
eminent-domain-fiasco.
350 INST. FOR JUSTICE, FIVE YEARS AFTER KELo: THE SWEEPING BACKLASH AGAINST
ONE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S MOsT-DESPISED DECISIONS (2010), http://www.ij.org/images/
pdf._folder/private-property/kelo/kelo5year.ann-white-paper.pdf.
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